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Abstract
Adjusting fixed price contract prices over long periods of performance is vital to
protect both the government and contractor from market price fluctuations. This is
accomplished via an Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) clause which currently utilize
forecasts of producer price indexes (PPI) as a baseline. There is currently a lack of
research on if the use of these forecasts as a baseline for calculating EPAs is the best
alternative. This research involves determining the validity of using Global Insight (GI)
forecasts for the purpose of calculating EPAs in fixed price contracts. Two EPA clauses
are examined as a case study proxy for what may be occurring on a broader scale DoD
wide. The PPI of interest to this research is PPI 336411, which covers the aircraft
manufacturing industry. The GI forecasts of PPI 336411 are compared to Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) managed actuals of the index to assess the accuracy as well as the
Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) derived escalation rates to determine if the
government is estimating escalation in line with the contractor. A change point analysis
is then conducted on the historical values of PPI 336411 to determine if significant
changes in the dataset are influencing the accuracy of forecasts. Lastly, a retrospective
approach to EPA clauses is recommended which utilizes changes in actuals to calculate
EPAs, as it resulted in a lower mean absolute percent error (MAPE) than the prospective
approach with respect to actuals. The outcome of this research is a recommendation that
the EPA clauses be rewritten to support a retrospective approach to calculating EPAs.
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A CASE STUDY OF EPA CLAUSES AS THEY APPLY TO FIXED PRICE
CONTRACTS
I. Introduction
Background
Accurate and reliable cost estimates are critical to successfully budgeting for the
research and development, procurement, and sustainment efforts of a program’s lifecycle.
For budgeting purposes, tracking the change in price over time is important for accurate
estimates. There are two types of price changes analysts are concerned with: inflation
and escalation. Inflation “is an economy-wide increase in the average price level”
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation [OSD
CAPE], 2017). The more specific form of cost growth, escalation, is the “changes in the
price of specific goods and services” (OSD CAPE, 2017). Because escalation contains a
component of inflation within it, escalation rates are generally valued over inflation rates
when the Producer Price Index (PPI), from which the rate is derived, is known. If an
incorrect PPI is used, or an inflation rate is used in place of the escalation rate, the
estimated cost growth will deviate further from the actual cost growth, leading to
underfunding of contracts.
DoD producer price indexes are typically provided over a five-year period called
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). However, government programs have
financial requirements that extend beyond this five-year period (OSD CAPE, 2017).
Therefore, a private firm’s forecast of the specific index is usually utilized. However,
even most of these forecasts fall short of the anticipated lifecycle of the program. The
responsibility then falls on the analyst to determine the method of extrapolation into the
1

years beyond the forecast that “maximizes the realism and stability of the cost estimate”
(OSD CAPE, 2017).
When projecting a forecasted rate far into the future, it is understood that there is
going to be fluctuation from the actual escalation rate. In the environment of a fixed
price contract, this unrealized Real Price Change (RPC) would become the financial
burden of the contractor. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 16.104(g) states
that in ''times of economic uncertainty, contracts extending over a relatively long period
may require economic price adjustment..." (FAR, 2017). Historically, Air Force Life
Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) aircraft and aircraft modifications contracts favor
longer periods of performance. Because of this, it is reasonable for the government to
provide security to the contractor if price escalation exceeds the assumptions made that
informed the pricing of the fixed-price bid. As a result, clauses are constructed requiring
EPAs to be applied to eligible aircraft and aircraft modification contracts.
These EPA clauses utilize producer price index PPI336411 Aircraft
Manufacturing as the benchmark for which eligibility for economic price adjustment is
measured (McGlothen, 2017). The index used is indicative of the economic trends of the
work performed on aircraft and aircraft modification contracts. Thus, the validity of the
use of PPI336411 as a benchmark is not in question. Rather, the issue is with the use of
current forecasts for that index as the basis for calculating economic price adjustments
(McGlothen, 2017).
Currently, AFLCMC utilizes Global Insight Inc.'s forecasts of PPI 336411 to
estimate future years escalation rates. However, there appears to be little analysis applied
to this forecasting, with rates beyond the ten-year forecast consistently being projected at
2

2.4%. The findings of a study conducted by AFLCMC and the Air Force Cost Analysis
Agency (AFCAA) from 2002 to 2010 indicated that the “GI forecasts for aerospace price
indices and employment cost indices appeared to be consistently lower than the price
growth experienced” (McGlothen, 2017). Additionally, Global Insight simply takes the
final year's escalation rate of the forecast and applies it to all future years for a program
beyond the ten-year forecast, with no variation. This methodology goes against CAPE
guidance that states “do not, however, automatically extrapolate the last forecast rate out
into the indefinite future” (OSD CAPE 2017). Because of these straight-lined rates, there
may be a systematic underestimation of price escalation. It is also believed, based on
Forward Pricing Rate Agreements, that contractors are accounting for higher escalation in
their proposals, between 3.5% and 4.7%, than GI is forecasting (McGlothen, 2017).
Therefore, when current GI forecasts rise above a specified threshold of the baseline
forecast specified in the EPA clause, the government is responsible for compensating the
contractor for a price change they may already be assuming in the contract.
Problem Statement
Under the EPA clauses examined, when the current year’s forecasted index value
varies up or down beyond a specified threshold in comparison to a baseline forecasted
value for the same index then an EPA payment is triggered. For example, to calculate an
EPA payment the current projected annual index value is divided by the baseline
projected annual index value, then that value is multiplied by 100. If the current index
forecast is above the baseline forecast by a specified threshold percentage, then a
payment to the contractor is triggered. Likewise, if the current index forecast is less than
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the baseline forecast by a specified percentage threshold then a payment to the
government is triggered. Previous studies have found Global Insight forecasts to be
consistently lower than actual price growth (McGlothen, 2017). Therefore, using an
inaccurate Global Insight forecast as the basis of the EPA clause could nearly guarantee
an EPA payment. Simultaneously, the contractor may be assuming higher escalation
within their Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRA) documents than the Global
Insight forecasts. The problem, therefore, is there may be double-payment of
contingency allowance for escalation impacts already assumed in the contractor rates.
The goal of the current study is to investigate two EPA clauses as a case study
representation of what is potentially happening DoD wide. A discrepancy of even just a
fraction of a percent extrapolated across the period of performance of a contract adds up
to a significant dollar value. If this is true, then there is potentially a large cost avoidance
to be realized by re-wording the EPA clauses.
Research Questions
The purpose of this research is to answer the following questions.
1) What amount is historically obligated for EPA adjustments, and how does this
compare to the total contract amount?
2) What is the accuracy of Global Insight forecasts in relation to historically
observed escalation rates in PPI 336411 Aircraft Manufacturing?
3) What are the differences between GI forecasted rates and contractor proposal
rates as manifested in FPRA documents?
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4) Where are there significant changes in the historical escalation rates of PPI
336411 and what do these imply about the validity of forecasting this index?
5) How does a retrospective EPA clause compare to a prospective EPA clause in
terms of Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE)?
6) What modifications are recommended to the current AFLCMC EPA clause?
Methodology
This research first determines the historical cost impact of EPAs. The research then
examines the overall accuracy of the GI forecasts as they relate to historical data
managed by BLS. The escalation rates of government program offices are then evaluated
compared to the escalation rates of defense contractors, as they pertain to fixed price
contracts. The historical index values are then analyzed to see if attempting to model
future values is feasible. There are 6 main sources the data was collected from. First, the
EPA payments are determined from the ConData database which will be discussed in
Chapter 3. Second, the Global Insight forecasts are sourced from the AFLCMC cost and
economics division. Third, the historical PPI values are sourced from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics website. Fourth, the FPRA documents are used to collect labor
escalation rates of defense contractors. The FPRA documents are obtained from the
source data of the AFLCMC Cost and Economics Division’s contractor wrap rate
calculator. And last, the EPA clauses are provided by AFLCMC Cost and Economics
Division.
The analysis begins with determining what has historically been paid in EPAs
using the ConData Database. Next, a comparison of GI forecasts of PPI336411 to
5

historical values of the same index is conducted to verify the accuracy of the forecasts.
Escalation rates pertaining to direct labor are then extracted from the FPRA documents of
six contractors and compared to the government forecast of escalation. Once this
evidence of what is currently happening is gathered, the validity of modeling future
values of this index is then determined by conducting a change point analysis on the
historical values of the index. The MAPE of a retrospective approach to EPAs is then
compared to the MAPE of the current prospective approach to EPAs. The research
concludes with a recommendation as to how to change the current EPA clauses to better
reflect what is occurring in the market.
Scope and Limitations
The scope of this research was limited to examining two different EPA clauses.
Within a contract there are many clauses related to price adjustments, however this
research only covers the use of economic price adjustments.
The number of programs examined was limited by the access to relevant EPA
clauses. The EPA clauses are often referenced within the contract yet not fully included
within the document, so access to the EPA clause documents were limited.
The number of ACAT I aircraft programs analyzed was limited by the availability
of FPRA data. The accuracy of the forecasted escalation rate was limited by the
availability of data points. Data for PPI336411 dates back only as far as 1985, leaving
only 33 points of actual data on the index.

6

Thesis Overview
The following chapter, the literature review, delves deeper into prior and related
research on this topic of study to identify the gap in the research in economic price
adjustments. How the research is conducted is explained in Chapter 3, the methodology
section of this paper, to ensure the results are analyzed through a valid analytical process.
Next, the findings of the research are discussed in Chapter 4 as well as the implications of
these findings and how they impact the DoD as a whole. Lastly, Chapter 5, the summary
and recommendations section, discusses the findings and provides recommendations.
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II. Literature Review
Background
Why does the cost to develop, produce and maintain DoD systems increase year by
year? Three main interrelated factors contribute to the escalation of prices over time. The
first is a decrease in the number of systems ordered per production lot. Second, in today’s
rapidly growing economy, constant technological advances lead to more technological
turnover within programs. And third, like the private sector, the DoD’s expenditures are
affected by increases in prices and wages (OSD CAPE, 2017). This research focuses on
the latter, third reason.
In the private sector the changing price of goods over time is a known
phenomenon. This general change in price of a basket of goods is commonly referred to
as inflation. According to this definition, the purchasing power of a dollar will change as
the inflation rate changes (OSD CAPE, 2017). In general terms, inflation is used to
describe a rise in the average price level for an economy at the macro level, however,
when looking at an economy as a whole, there are thousands of commodities and services
that constitute price increases in an economy, making the application of inflation more
complex (OSD CAPE, 2017). This complexity arises from specific commodities’ and
services’ prices changing at different rates due to factors such as market shifts, economies
and diseconomies of scale, or changes to inputs of production (OSD CAPE, 2017).
Because of this difference in price growth it is necessary to utilize escalation to determine
the price changes of a specific commodity or service.
8

Transitioning from the private sector to the Department of Defense creates more
complexity with the comparison of dollars appropriated in a given year, but spent over
multiple years (OSD CAPE, 2017). To address this added complexity, program offices
will utilize escalation rates to compare future year dollars (often referred to as Then-Year
dollars) to current year dollars (often referred to as Constant Year Dollars). More detail
about the derivation of escalation rates is discussed later in this chapter.
Government Procurement Process and Contracts
Government procurement is the process by which the government acquires goods
or services from a contracting entity. The vessel which allows for legal exchange of
goods or services is the contract. Contracts are important because 1. “any trade -- as a
quid pro quo -- must be mediated by some form of contract”, and 2. “they provide the
foundation for a large part of economic analysis” (Hart, 1986). Before a contract is
awarded there are certain steps that must be taken to ensure a lawful and fair process. In
a contract by negotiation the government first submits a Request for Proposal (RFP) to
the participating bidders. This RFP outlines the requirements and requests technical and
pricing information from the seller (US Department of State, 2018). Proposals are then
submitted by the sellers and evaluated by the government based on established criteria in
the RFP. Once all proposals are evaluated there may be negotiations held to resolve any
issues arising from proposed hours or material required. Upon a consensus the contract
will be awarded based on the criteria the government set in the original RFP.
Government contracts fall into two general categories, fixed-price and costreimbursement contracts. Which contract the government chooses to use is dictated by
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the nature of the product or service they are acquiring. For instance, when acquiring a
commercial product or awarding a contract based on a sealed bid, the government must
use a fixed price contract (DAU, 2017). Cost-reimbursement contracts are recommended
when uncertainty in the contract performance does not allow for an accurate estimate of
cost (DAU, 2017).
The contract type chosen will determine which party bears the cost risk: the
government or the contractor. With a fixed-price contract, cost risk falls on the
contractor, as they have complete control over the magnitude of their profit or loss,
making this contract type the most auspicious choice for the government under
circumstances that favor shifting the risk to the contractor. From the contractor’s
perspective, a cost-plus-fixed-fee may be the most beneficial contract when the
circumstances favor shifting the risk to the government. This contract type places the
majority of the cost risk on the government because the profit paid to the contractor is
fixed regardless of the performance. There are various other incentive-type contracts that
fall on a spectrum of assumed risk between these two contract types. A visual of this
spectrum can be seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Government Contract Spectrum (State Procurement Office, 2018)
Economic Price Adjustments
This research focuses on fixed price with EPA contracts. As the name implies,
fixed price contracts “provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis
of the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract” (FAR, 2017). The benefit
of a fixed price contract is that it shifts the cost risk from the government to the
contractor. In other words, if the contractor exceeds estimated costs to complete the
work, the government is not responsible for compensation. The economic price
adjustment portion of the contract protects both sides, the government and the contractor,
of any unforeseen change in the market price of the good or service. The EPA is based
on the cost index of labor or material and is utilized when any of the following three
circumstances are met:
1. The contract involves an extended period of performance with significant
costs to be incurred beyond 1 year after performance begins;
11

2. The contract amount subject to adjustment is substantial; and
3. The economic variables for labor and materials are too unstable to permit a
reasonable division of risk between the Government and the contractor,
without this type of clause (FAR, 2017).
Two EPA clauses are referenced in this research, one for KC-46 lots 3-13 and one for the
C-5 lots 4-7. The full clauses are in Appendix A.
What is the advantage of incorporating an EPA into a fixed price contract? In a
case study of petroleum coke conducted in 1987 by Victor P. Goldberg and John R.
Erickson, the problems of quantity and price adjustments in long term contracts are
examined as they pertain to the product petroleum coke. In this investigation two
potential reasons for using EPAs in long term contracts are concluded. “First, adjusting
the price to keep it in line with current market prices gives the parties the proper short-run
price signals” (Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). This speaks to the importance of indexing
the price of a good to be commensurate with the market price. In the case of coke, the
quantity of petroleum coke demanded was a reflection of the refinery’s demand for fuel,
not for coke (Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). Therefore, indexing the price of a good to
the correct input item will have major impacts on the accurate forecasts of short and longterm price changes.
The other reason for incorporating EPAs into long-term contracts includes the
overall reduction of incentive for one or both parties to breach contract terms or behave
opportunistically (Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). In a long-term contract both parties
have an incentive to expend resources to better predict the future costs and prices of
goods. Therefore, it is advantageous for both parties to include in their initial agreement
12

an EPA to minimize wasteful spending of valuable resources (Goldberg and Erickson,
1987). This case study provides insight into how EPAs are used and why they are used
within the private sector. Similarly, the same uses and reasons for use can be applied in a
government contract setting, as long-term private contracts follow similar principles to
long-term government contracts.
A third situation for using EPAs is take-or-pay contracts. These take-or-pay
contracts often “link sellers and buyers for a long period, generally 20-25 and even up to
30 years” (Creti and Villeneuve, 2004). The drawback of these style contracts is the
inflexibility of prices with demand and supply fluctuations. However, this can be
mitigated by applying clauses that stipulate a floor price and allows for upward
adjustment following price escalators. These price escalators are tied to specific price
indexes (Creti and Villeneuve, 2004). This is further evidence of the efficacy of applying
EPA clauses in long-term contracts and linking them to price indexes.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), from which the government obtains
producer price index (PPI) data, spells out guidelines to follow when creating a clause in
a contract to account for an EPA. First, a baseline cost of the end item on contract is
established with a detailed description of the end item as well as the month and year of
the established base price. Second, an appropriate PPI is selected that falls in line closely
to the product or service on contract. For the remainder of this paper PPI336411 is the
focus, which encompasses the price of aircraft manufacturing and is the benchmark
against which the eligibility for an economic price adjustment is determined. Third, the
source of the PPI data is documented clearly. Fourth, the frequency of the price
adjustment is specified, typically quarterly, semi-annually, or annually. Next, both the
13

contractor and the government agree on a specific base and comparison months within
the price adjustment. Lastly, the methodology of the price adjustment is then explicitly
explained (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017). For the remainder of the paper, the KC46 and C-5 EPA clauses pertaining to PPI 336411 is referenced.
EPAs in Defense Programs
FFP contracts on major government programs tend to span long periods into the
future. Due to their long periods of performance, these FFPs are eligible to include
economic price adjustments. These economic adjustments allow for “upward and
downward revision of the stated contract price” (FAR, 2017). These revisions can stem
from multiple scenarios. The first being “adjustments based on established prices” (FAR,
2017). If a good or service is generally accepted to cost a specific amount less than what
the contractor established in their proposal, then an EPA may be applied to allow for this
adjustment. Second, EPAs can stem from “adjustments based on actual cost of labor or
material” (FAR, 2017). If the contractor proposed a specific price of a piece of material
but the actual cost incurred was less than the proposed amount, then an EPA may be
applied to the original proposal. Last, an EPA can come about from “adjustments based
on cost indexes of labor or material” (FAR, 2017). These can either be forecasted index
values or actual values of the index as reflective of the market.
As previously stated, best practice requires an EPA clause to specify the exact PPI
used as a basis to track changes in the price of a good or service over time. BLS
maintains data on two different price indexes, both used for distinct and different
purposes. The first index is the consumer price index, which tracks the change of all
goods and services purchased by consumers in urban households (US BLS, 2017). This
14

index is relevant as it is the base index for calculating inflation. Simply stated, the CPI is
the raw data of the price change and the inflation rate is the calculated percent change of
price year by year. The second index BLS tracks is the Producer Price Index (PPI). PPIs
differ from the CPI in that it measures the change in price over time in the selling price of
a good or service from the producer’s perspective, rather than the consumer’s (US BLS,
2017). Similar to the CPI in relation to inflation, PPIs are used as a base to calculate
escalation rates.
Forecasting Escalation: Current Practice
Price escalation rates are derived from producer price indexes (PPI), which are
generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to measure the change in the price
received by a producer for a specific good or service they provide (OSD CAPE, 2017).
These PPIs are specific to thousands of goods and services and are disaggregated to lower
levels within each industry. For example, PPI 3364 covers the aerospace product and
parts manufacturing industry. Below this industry level PPI is PPI 336411, which tracks
the price changes of aircraft manufacturing specifically (US BLS, 2017). Escalation rates
are calculated by simply finding the percent change in the PPI year-by-year. This
research focuses on PPI 336411.
A corporation called Global Insight creates forecasts for thousands of PPIs which
the government then uses for contracting purposes. Not only are accurate escalation rates
important because there is a clause that requires the government to compensate the
contractor for inaccurate escalation forecasts, but also because “accurate and reliable
estimates allow proper expression of life cycle costs, budgeting and program
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requirements...” (Sweitzer, 1997). It is this accurate forecasting of price escalation that
allows for proper budgeting and mitigates fees paid to the contractor.
If there is a discrepancy, even minor, in the forecasting of price escalation
between the DoD and contractor, these minor differences could result in the government
to paying unneeded compensation to the contractor. While there are limited studies that
have been conducted on price escalation, there have been studies published on inflation.
Recall that inflation is defined as “a persistent rise in the prices associated with a basket
of goods and services that is not offset by increased productivity” (Tayari, 2017).
Escalation, similarly, is “a persistent rise in the price of specific commodities, goods, or
services due to a combination of inflation, supply/demand, and other effects such as
environmental and engineering changes” (Tayari, 2017). In other words, inflation refers
to the rise in prices of a general basket of goods or services, while escalation refers to a
specific good or service. Due to this similarity it is reasonable to apply lessons learned
from this study on inflation to research on price escalation.
An internal study conducted by AFLCMC/FZC and the Air Force Cost Analysis
Agency (AFCAA) in 2011 compared the Global Insight forecast for aerospace price
index PPI 3364 and labor cost indexes to actual growth experienced. The results show
that GI forecasts of price escalation are consistently lower than actual growth
experienced. These differences “are substantial and become quite severe with
compounding over several years' time” (McGlothen, 2017). It is therefore reasonable to
assume that consistency between GI forecasts, BLS actuals, and contractor forward
pricing rate agreements is pertinent to the accurate representation of costs for government
acquisitions programs. This study, however, can be expanded on with eight more years
16

of data from 2009 to 2017, as well as analyzing PPI 336411 instead of PPI 3364, as PPI
336411 is the index referenced in the two EPA clauses referred to in this research. This
research also expands on this study by examining more government contractors,
determining the historical cost impact of EPAs, and analyzes the historical data to
determine if using forecasts as a basis for EPAs is appropriate.
Paul Joskow (1987) conducted a study on price adjustments in long term coal
contracts, which concluded that “some contracts track changes in market values very
poorly” (Joskow, 1987). As with Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) program's contracts
“the vast majority of long-term coal contracts use a base price plus escalation” formula to
account for uncontrollable price changes (Joskow, 1987). Joskow explains that fixed
price contracts that rely on forecast expectations of future costs are bound to have errors
resulting from poor forecast techniques and inability to accurately predict future cost
changes.
To combat these price changes Joskow states that some type of cost-plus contract
may be utilized. In a cost-plus contract, a contractor is paid for all of “its allowed
expenses, typically up to a set limit” and then paid some set amount to account for profit
(CSIS, 2008). Joskow essentially states that the amount paid to the contractor in this
situation is accounting for the economic price increase over time. However, he then
states that cost plus contracts provide minimum incentive to the seller to provide
minimum cost supply. These cost plus contracts do not accurately account for
“unanticipated changes in market supply and demand conditions” (Joskow, 1987). This
deemphasizing of cost plus contracts is mirrored in the public sector through the passage
of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) in 2009. One of the main
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objectives of WSARA is "to encourage competition to reduce sole-source contracting
(often cost-plus based) and pave the way for greater use of fixed-price contracting”
(Wang, 2013).
Instead of using cost-plus contracts to account for price increases, Joskow argues
that a “base price plus escalation” type contract is a better alternative (Joskow, 1987).
This type of contract provides a “base price reflecting supply and demand conditions
when the contract is signed and which then provides for adjustments in the base price
using a formula that incorporates a weighted average of exogenous input price indexes
reflecting” the anticipated change in both raw material and labor costs (Joskow, 1987).
This is essentially equivalent to the DoD’s usage of a FFP contract with an EPA included,
as mandated by the FAR for all contracts spanning multiple years that meet the
requirements of an EPA. The key to this method being successful at accounting for
market price changes is the accuracy of the forecasting. If the market value of the raw
materials “moves along with the changes in prices...then this method seems superior to a
cost-plus contract” (Joskow, 1987). Therefore, the accuracy of the indexes used in the
forecasting are a key driver in the accuracy of the overall EPA.
An example of how an EPA clause could have been utilized in the private sector
to avoid unneeded litigation is spelled out in the 1967 court case of Alcoa v. Essex.
Alcoa signed a twenty-year contract agreeing to convert Essex’s alumina into molten
aluminum. The initial contract was for 50 million pounds of molten aluminum per year
at a price of 15 cents per pound (Goldberg, 1987). Fixed costs and ceiling prices were
established as well, however, in 1973 a large increase in the price of fuel had a major
effect on the price of aluminum, causing it to increase at a greater rate than what was on
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contract. This change in outside economic conditions led to prices originally spelled out
in the contract to be compromised by Alcoa. The court ruled in favor of Alcoa because
they determined both Alcoa and Essex had tracked the Wholesale Price Index poorly,
leading to the un-anticipated change in fixed prices within the contract (Goldberg, 1987).
The case of Alcoa v. Essex is a prime example of how a well-defined EPA clause
could have been utilized. The contract spelled out an upward allowable price adjustment
of 65% of the price of a specified type of aluminum (Goldberg, 1987). Because this
ceiling price was not tied to an accurately tracked price index, it was impossible to
predict how the price of aluminum would change. This case potentially could have been
avoided if a price index representative of aluminum had been agreed upon by both parties
and written into an EPA clause that allowed for an upward and downward adjustment of
the price of aluminum. If the EPA clause also spelled out an upper and lower minimum
threshold of price index adjustment for an EPA to be paid to the required party, then
litigation could have been avoided.
As discussed earlier, a case study on the petroleum coke industry discussed the
reasons for utilizing EPAs in long term contracts. This study found that 90 percent of the
pre-1973 contracts and all of the post-1973 contracts provided some price flexibility
(Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). Indexing a price of a good to the historic market price of
an input good is one of the mechanisms for incorporating a price adjustment. This is a
very similar method to what government contracts do when they write EPA clauses into
contracts. A price index is selected that accurately reflects the market price of the end
item, and then a maximum and minimum threshold is established for allowable changes
in the forecast of the base index. This comparison of the private sector to the government
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sector is important in that it demonstrates there is a precedence set by the private sector in
creating EPA clauses in these warranted situations. However, where the government may
be lacking is in how they go about implementing these EPA clauses.
The importance of accurate inflation indexes is examined in a paper published by
the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). Inflation indexes differ from escalation indexes
in that they “cover the entire economy as a whole”, while escalation indexes “cover
specific classes of goods and services” (Horowitz, 2012). On the basis of forecasting
inflation rates beyond the five-year Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), it is
mandated by OMB Circular No. A-94 that the “inflation assumption can be extended by
using the inflation rate for the sixth year of the budget forecast” (OMB, 1992). In other
words, for the purpose of inflation there is essentially no analysis applied to the inflation
forecast extending beyond five years. Instead, projects extending beyond five years “are
advised to use the final year's rate in perpetuity” (OMB, 1992). This creates a potential
problem, in that using a single year's rate as a basis for future years may be inaccurate. If
actual inflation rates grow faster than forecast rates, “programs will be systematically
underfunded, leading to unnecessarily high real program cost growth” (Horowitz, 2012).
Thus, it may be more beneficial to apply some other technique to forecast beyond five
years.
As with inflation, the same issues of forecasting accuracy arise for escalation. As
examined previously in the study conducted on AFLCMC on the importance of proper
EPA predictions, the report states that in competitive fixed price contracts with EPA, it is
reasonable that “historical averages serve as the basis for calculating a fair economic
price adjustment” (McGlothen, 2017). This conclusion is backed because historical
20

averages of aerospace indexes used by Global Insight coincide with industry's tendency
to forecast price growth at 3%.
Change Point Analysis
One of the goals of this research is to analyze the historical data of PPI 336411 to
determine if there are change points that are interfering with the accuracy of GI forecasts.
Change point analysis is useful in three applications: determining if process
improvements led to a shift in the data, problem solving, and trend analysis (Gavit,
Tholmer and Baddour, 2009). This research focuses on utilizing change point analysis as
a problem-solving method to determine if trends in the historical data of PPI 336411 are
leading to unreliable forecasts. As an example, an article in the BioPharm International
journal discusses a situation when change point analysis is used as a problem-solving
technique. A medical manufacturing facility is having issues with out-of-range results
for sodium concentration in a processing buffer. To determine if the out-of-range batches
are a result of a shift in sodium concentration of the buffer a change point analysis should
be run on the sodium concentration of the buffer outputs (Gavit, Tholmer and Baddour,
2009). This research focuses solely on historical shifts in PPI 336411 values and how
they may be affecting forecast reliability. In this situation, the PPI values are the input
and the GI forecasts are the output.
This research uses a combination of cumulative sum (CUMSUM) charts and
bootstrapping to detect changes. CUMSUM charts “rely on a visual assessment of
whether there is a change in the slope” (Gavit, Tholmer and Baddour, 2009). A
cumulative sum is a running total of the deviation of each individual data point from the
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average of the data. Therefore, a CUMSUM chart is just a plot of all the CUMSUMs in
the data set. In times when the values tend to be above the average, the CUMSUM chart
will reflect a positive slope, while in times when the values tend to be below the average,
the CUMSUM chart will reflect a negative slope. A change point, therefore, is marked
by a sudden shift in the slope of the CUMSUM chart and represents a point in time when
the overall trend of the data suddenly shifted (Taylor, 2000). These change points create
irregular shifts in the data that can make it more complex to accurately forecast future
values.
There are many forecasting techniques available, however not many are able to
take into account random noise in the data. Two methods that do take this into account
are decomposition and intervention models. Decomposition models are used to forecast
time series data by decomposing the data into four different factors: trend, seasonal,
cyclical, and irregular (Bowerman, O’Connell and Koeler, 2005). The irregular piece of
these models captures the error and erratic behavior that is difficult to predict. However,
these models “have no theoretical basis-they are strictly an intuitive approach”
(Bowerman, O’Connell and Koeler, 2005). Likewise, intervention models are used
“when exceptional external events, called interventions, affect the variable being
forecasted” (Bowerman, O’Connell and Koeler, 2005). These models are an iteration of
Box-Jenkins models and can be very beneficial with data that contains change points.
However, the issue with these models is not their accuracy, but rather their application as
a basis in an EPA clause. Though there is no insight into what exact methods GI utilizes
to forecast PPI values, the use of any forecast as the basis for calculating EPAs is likely
to result in unwarranted EPA payments. When the EPA is based on forecast the accuracy
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of the forecast is inherently going to have an effect on whether an EPA is triggered and
what the magnitude is. If EPAs are based on historical averages of actual PPI values,
then the forecasting error is taken out of the equation. This is the difference between a
prospective and a retrospective EPA clause.
Evidence to suggest a retrospective EPA clause is a plausible solution is outlined
in Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFARs). DFARs section PGI 216.203-4
mandates when EPA clauses should be used, how they should be implemented, and all
the details on what they should include. This document essentially spells out exactly how
to write an EPA clause. It specifies the clause should be based on an index that is not so
diverse that it is significantly affected by fluctuations not relevant to contract
performance, but also not so narrow so as to minimize the effect of any single company
(DFARS PGI 216.203-4, 2012). Though it is agreed an EPA clause should be based on
an appropriate index, DFARS does not specify whether the EPA should be based on
historical index values or proprietary forecasts of said index. Therefore, it is up to the
contracting officer, or whoever is writing the clause, to determine which method is most
appropriate.
The expected impact of fixing this escalation issue will vary depending on the
overall magnitude and length of the contract. However, “in times of lower price growth,
as has been experienced over the past 5 years, the result would be money being returned
to the Air Force for application elsewhere” (McGlothen, 2017). The current EPA clause
does stipulate this protection to the government but in practice the clause may not be
exercised. Considering the current number of active contracts in the Air Force, “it is
conceivable that the impact over the next decade could amount to hundreds of millions of
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dollars of precious obligation authority being spared from improper economic price
adjustment payment” (McGlothen, 2017).
Chapter Summary
There is a current gap in the research regarding escalation forecasting and
application of FFP contracts with EPAs. This paper aims to accomplish five goals. First,
understand what has been historically paid in regards to EPAs. Second, determine the
accuracy of Global Insight forecast compared to historic data of PPI336411. Third,
identify the quantitative difference between GI forecasted rates and contractor proposal
rates within the FPRAs. Fourth, explore the historical data of PPI 336411 for any change
points. And last, provide recommendations for changes to the current AFLCMC EPA
clause.
The next chapter will discuss the methodology of the research conducted. Then
the results and analysis will be detailed in chapter four. And finally, a summary of the
research findings will be laid out in chapter five.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter covers the methodologies applied to each research question. The
methodologies serve four main objectives. First, a contract modification database is used
to identify how many Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) modifications there have been
and describe the total obligated amounts for those modifications. Second, Global Insight
(GI) data is analyzed to determine the accuracy of current Producer Price Index (PPI)
forecasts compared to historical observations. Third, GI data as well as Forward Pricing
Rate Agreements (FPRA) are utilized to identify the difference between GI forecasts of
PPI data versus what contractors are proposing in the FPRA documents. Last, a change
point analysis is conducted on the historical escalation rates of PPI 336411.
This chapter first discusses the data for each of these objectives. Next, the data
sources for each objective are examined, as well as data limitations. Last, the
methodology for each research question is explained.
Historical Economic Price Adjustments
The 2011 AFLCMC study suggested reducing inappropriate EPA obligations could
lead to hundreds of millions of dollars saved in obligation authority.

To gain an

understanding of the cost impact these EPAs have had through the years, EPA contract
modifications from 1981 to 2017 are analyzed to determine how much historically has been
obligated as related to EPAs.
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Data and Data Sources
The data for this research question comes from the ConData database collected by
AFLCMC’s cost and economics division. The database contains 46,367 different
contracts and contract modifications. They are exported to excel and sorted by a
multitude of descriptive columns including PIIN order ID (identification number),
division (airframe), cage number (prime contractor), mod ID, total contract price,
modification obligation amount, etc. This data requires normalization to a Constant
Price. The term Constant Price (CP) is used when costs are normalized with an
escalation index (OSD CAPE, 2017). To accomplish the normalization, the BLS
managed historical data of PPI 336411 are used to escalate contract obligation amounts to
CP 2017 dollars.
The EPA clauses for the C-5 Reliability Enhancements and Re-Engineering
Program (RERP) as well as the KC-46 are used as a reference for the entire thesis. Both
these establish PPI 336411 as a basis for calculating EPAs.
Data Limitations
The ConData database is derived from the Contract Writing System (ConWrite)
which is the main system utilized for all pre and post-award contract activities and hence
all contracts are processed through this system (FAR, 2017). The database contains
contracts dating back to 1982. It is clear this database is not inclusive, however. Based
on 2008 Inspector General (IG) report that examined DoD multiyear contracts of the C17, F/A-18, and the AH-64D, it was determined Boeing contracts for these three
airframes resulted in an EPA liability of between $90.2 million and $260.3 million due to

26

Boeing contributions to pension plans causing abnormal increases in the BLS PPI
(Inspector General [IG], 2008). No contract modifications of this magnitude are found in
the ConData database used. The IG’s unique methodology indicates there is no
consolidated database with accurate EPAs accounted for. Therefore, the implication for
the current study is to determine an estimate for EPAs. To obtain an inclusive total of the
EPA values, individual calculations for all multiyear contracts would need to be
calculated from each respective EPA clause. Therefore, EPA totals found in this research
may be an underestimate. Also, the two clauses referenced in this thesis are not inclusive
of all EPA clauses. EPA clauses are all written uniquely for what contract they
supplement. However, these two clauses were chosen as a proxy to analyze the utility of
forecasts as a basis for calculating EPAs. Parallels from this analysis can be applied to
other EPA clauses regardless of the index specified.
Methodology
The modification database is first sorted on the division column to include only
aircraft contracts. This returns a total of 266 contracts. The database is then filtered on
modification description using the keywords “Price Adjustment”. This returns all
contract modifications related to any type of price adjustment, a total of 80 contract
modifications. The modification ID is then filtered specifically on “Price Adjustment” to
parse out any modifications not related to price adjustments. This returns a total of 49
modifications. The modification description is then filtered again using the keyword
“economic” to return only modifications related to economic price adjustments. This
returns a total of 20 modifications. An inclusion and exclusion table is shown in Table 1
that walks through the steps of filtering the data.
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Table 1: Inclusion/Exclusion Table
Step
Filter division
Filter purchase description using
keywords "Price Adjustment"
Filter modification ID using keywords
"Price Adjustment"
Filter purchase description using
keyword "economic"

Include
All aircraft contracts
All data related to price adjustments
of any kind
All data categorized as price
adjustment modifications
All data related to economic price
adjustment modifications

Exclude
All data unrelated to aircraft contracts
All data unrelated to "Price
Adjustments"
All data unrelated to "Price
Adjustments"
All data unrelated to economic price
adjustement modifications

Result
266 data points
80 data points
49 data points
20 data points

Once the data is filtered to show all economic price adjustments, the modification
obligation amount and original contract price is escalated to a 2017 CP. The obligation
amounts are in CP dollar amounts. It is assumed that the dollar values are in CP dollar
amounts of the effective date of the contract. CP 2017 is chosen as a normalized date
because that is the latest effective date in the list of modifications. To escalate the values
to a CP dollar amount, the value of PPI336411 of Oct 2017 is divided by the index value
of the effective date of the current contract. This provides an escalation factor that is then
multiplied by the modification obligation amount and the original contract price to return
an escalated value of the obligation amount and contract price in CP 2017 dollars.
The escalated obligated amount of the EPA and original contract amount are then
summed up by airframe. This returns total dollar amount for both categories for a total of
5 airframes. To determine the percent of the total contract that the economic price
adjustment makes up, the total obligated amount of the EPA is divided by the total
contract price and then multiplied by 100. The airframe, total contract price, total
obligated amount, and percent of contract are then consolidated into a table.
Global Insight Forecasts vs Historical Values
Accuracy of GI forecasts compared to actuals are important as they are the
baseline from which EPA payments are determined. If the forecasts deviate from the
actuals, then they are not reflective of what is happening in the aircraft manufacturing
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industry. The purpose of the EPA is to provide protection to both the government and
contractor from unanticipated changes in the economy, not a forecast. In the 2011
AFLCMC study it was determined GI forecasts of PPI 3364 were historically below
actuals of the PPI. This research compares GI forecasts of PPI 336411, a more
representative index of the aircraft manufacturing industry than the previously examined
PPI 3364, to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) actuals including 8 more years of data than
the 2011 AFLCMC study.
Data and Data Sources
The data sources for this section of the research are IHS Global Insight (GI)
forecasts as well as BLS managed PPI data from PPI336411. Global Insight is an
economic analysis division of IHS Markit. According to the IHS Markit website, IHS
Markit connects data across variables to provide their customers with a more detailed
view of their field of study (IHS Markit Website, 2017). The DoD utilizes GI to provide
detailed forecasts of all Producer Price Indexes which the DoD then applies to building
EPA clauses for government contracts.
PPI 336411 was chosen because it pertains to the price of aircraft manufacturing
and it is the baseline PPI for the EPA clauses under examination. The BLS historical
data of PPI 336411 contains tracked actual index values spanning back to 1985 and is
broken out by month. These data points are then compared to the GI forecasts which are
completed on a quarterly basis and span back to 2004 for PPI 336411. Therefore,
historical data from 2004 to 2017 is the final dataset utilized for comparison.
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Data Limitations
The data from BLS spans a total of 33 years, with measured values every month.
This provides a total of 396 historically observed data points from PPI 336411.
However, the average monthly forecast was used as a snapshot value of the escalation for
each year.
Global Insight’s forecast span only 13 years, with forecasted values of PPI
336411 observed once every quarter. Therefore, to have one forecast for each year, the
quarter four forecasts are used as a determinant of each year’s forecast. The limiting data
source, in this case, is the Global Insight forecasts because there are fewer data points
available than the BLS historical data. Therefore, to address this limitation, the data is
only compared from 2005 to 2017. To limit any excess data noise while still allowing for
robust analysis, a total of seven forecasts are used, starting with the 2005 quarter four
forecast and every other year’s quarter four forecast through 2017.
Methodology
The first step in determining the accuracy of the GI forecasts is to compare the GI
forecasts of PPI 336411 to the actual performance of the index. The raw index historical
values from 2002 to 2017 are plotted along with the average of the GI forecasts of years
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. The escalation rate of PPI336411 is then
calculated for both the historical data as well as all the GI forecasts using Equation 1.

Equation 1: Escalation
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In Equation 1, Eₙ is the escalation in year n, and PPIₙ is the PPI value in year n. The
escalation rates of the average GI forecast are then graphed along with the actual
escalation rates to provide an analysis of the accuracy of the GI forecasts.
Because the escalation rates fluctuate up and down at a seemingly sporadic rate, it
is difficult to determine the deviation of the GI forecasts to the actual escalation.
Therefore, the deviation of the GI forecasted escalation to actual escalation is calculated
for each year in the forecasts and plotted on a graph. The deviation of the average
forecast from the actuals is also calculated. The deviation is calculated using Equation 2.
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 − 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
Equation 2: Deviation
In Equation 2 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 is the GI forecast escalation rate and 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 is the actual escalation rate.
To determine an overall accuracy trend of the GI forecasts, the net total deviation and
absolute total deviation is calculated for each GI forecast used.
Global Insight Forecasts vs Contractor FPRA Direct Labor Escalation
In the 2011 AFLCMC study it was determined one defense contractor with annual
labor escalation was well above GI forecasts. This research compares a total of 6
contractor’s direct labor escalation rates to GI forecasts and analyzes any trends. If in
general the contractors are assuming higher escalation in the FPRAs than what GI is
forecasting, then they may be receiving compensation escalation already assumed in the
contract’s base price.
Data and Data Sources
The data sources for this section of research include the GI forecasted values of
PPI336411 as well as the assumed escalation rates manifested in contractor FPRAs. The
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FPRA documents represent 6 different contractors and are provided by AFLCMC cost
and economics division. The FPRAs contain the approved labor rates of each contractor
on a yearly basis. From these rate values, the assumed escalation rate can be derived by
simply calculating the percentage increase of the direct labor portion of the FPRA rate
year-by-year. Due to releasability of proprietary information within the FPRAs the
names of the specific contractors are not provided.
Data and Limitations
The limitations, already discussed, of the GI forecasted data remain for this
research area. The GI data only spans 13 years and only the fourth quarter forecasts are
utilized. However, the FPRA documents contain labor rates ranging from 2014 to 2021
depending on the contractor. Therefore, when comparing the derived escalation rates
from the GI forecasts to the escalation rates within the FPRA documents, a maximum of
five and a minimum of three data points are available for comparison.
The direct labor rates within the FPRAs are not a perfect representation of the
assumed escalation by each contractor. Actual escalation rates for firm fixed price
contracts are not officially released to the government, therefore the FPRA labor rates are
used as a proxy to determine an approximate escalation value each year for the
contractors. The direct labor rate portion of the FPRA are chosen as a proxy for deriving
escalation because escalation is heavily influenced by labor.
Methodology
As previously discussed, GI data does not provide the escalation rates on a yearly
basis. Instead, the quarterly values of PPI 336411 are provided. Therefore, the yearly
escalation rates are derived from these values by way of equation 1. Similarly, the
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FPRAs do not provide yearly escalation rates. Instead, the FPRAs contain the yearly
labor rates for each contractor. The escalation rates assumed in the FPRAs are derived by
calculating the yearly percent change of the labor rates.
Within each FPRA the contractor details a multitude of different direct labor rates
depending on the type of laborer. Each of these categories of rates are escalated
differently, however for comparison purposes, one value of direct labor escalation for
each FPRA needs to be obtained. Therefore, descriptive statistics are calculated for each
year’s escalation values, including all labor categories. The escalation rates of each
category are also plotted to show a visual representation of any potential outliers. The
median was then chosen in the FPRAs as the consolidated rate for all years because this
is the best measure of central tendency for both normal and skewed distributions.
For example, Table 2 shows the direct labor rates of a contractor within the
FPRA. As is shown, there are multiple categories of laborers and within each category
are different skill classes. All these laborers have different labor rates that are escalated
each year differently. The derived escalation rates are shown next to the resource code
column. The rates are approximately the same for each but have some variation. To get
one escalation rate for each year, descriptive statistics are calculated for each year. The
results of this are shown in Table 3.
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Table 2: Contractor 1 FPRA Direct Labor Rates and Escalation
Category

Eng/PMO

Support

Eng/PMO

Support

Eng/PMO

Support

DIREC+C45:M61T LABOR RATES
Skill Class 2017
2018
2019
1
$ 39.37 $ 40.31 $ 41.28
2
$ 35.09 $ 35.93 $ 36.79
3
$ 38.12 $ 39.03 $ 39.97
4
$ 66.16 $ 67.75 $ 69.38
5
$ 85.65 $ 87.71 $ 89.82
1
$ 41.72 $ 42.72 $ 43.75
2
$ 28.22 $ 28.90 $ 29.59
3
$ 31.76 $ 32.52 $ 33.30
4
$ 49.15 $ 50.33 $ 51.54
5
$ 64.92 $ 66.48 $ 68.08
1
$ 29.95 $ 30.67 $ 31.41
2
$ 32.13 $ 32.90 $ 33.69
3
$ 35.21 $ 36.06 $ 36.93
4
$ 57.43 $ 58.81 $ 60.22
5
$ 73.67 $ 75.44 $ 77.25
1
$ 29.95 $ 30.67 $ 31.41
2
$ 26.83 $ 27.47 $ 28.13
3
$ 32.47 $ 33.25 $ 34.05
4
$ 47.52 $ 48.66 $ 49.83
5
$ 64.33 $ 65.87 $ 67.45
1
$ 22.87 $ 23.42 $ 23.98
2
$ 23.56 $ 24.13 $ 24.71
3
$ 34.32 $ 35.14 $ 35.98
4
$ 52.65 $ 53.91 $ 55.20
5
$ 65.17 $ 66.73 $ 68.33
1
$ 22.87 $ 23.42 $ 23.98
2
$ 23.56 $ 24.13 $ 24.71
3
$ 30.97 $ 31.71 $ 32.47
4
$ 44.44 $ 45.51 $ 46.60
5
$ 55.42 $ 56.75 $ 58.11

Escalation Factors

2020
$ 42.27
$ 37.67
$ 40.93
$ 71.05
$ 91.98
$ 44.80
$ 30.30
$ 34.10
$ 52.78
$ 69.71
$ 32.16
$ 34.50
$ 37.82
$ 61.67
$ 79.10
$ 32.16
$ 28.81
$ 34.87
$ 51.03
$ 69.07
$ 24.56
$ 25.30
$ 36.84
$ 56.52
$ 69.97
$ 24.56
$ 25.30
$ 33.25
$ 47.72
$ 59.50

2017
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%

2018

2019

2020

2.388%
2.394%
2.387%
2.403%
2.405%
2.397%
2.410%
2.393%
2.401%
2.403%
2.404%
2.397%
2.414%
2.403%
2.403%
2.404%
2.385%
2.402%
2.399%
2.394%
2.405%
2.419%
2.389%
2.393%
2.394%
2.405%
2.419%
2.389%
2.408%
2.400%

2.406%
2.394%
2.408%
2.406%
2.406%
2.411%
2.388%
2.399%
2.404%
2.407%
2.413%
2.401%
2.413%
2.398%
2.399%
2.413%
2.403%
2.406%
2.404%
2.399%
2.391%
2.404%
2.390%
2.393%
2.398%
2.391%
2.404%
2.397%
2.395%
2.396%

2.398%
2.392%
2.402%
2.407%
2.405%
2.400%
2.399%
2.402%
2.406%
2.394%
2.388%
2.404%
2.410%
2.408%
2.395%
2.388%
2.417%
2.408%
2.408%
2.402%
2.419%
2.388%
2.390%
2.391%
2.400%
2.419%
2.388%
2.402%
2.403%
2.392%

Table 3: Contractor 1 Descriptive Statistics of Escalation Rates

Mean
Median
Mode

Contractor 1
2018
2019
2.400% 2.401%
2.402% 2.402%
2.404% 2.413%

2020
2.401%
2.402%
2.388%

After the descriptive statistics are calculated, the escalation rates for each year are
graphed to show the distribution. This is shown in Figure 2. In this case the rates appear
to be evenly distributed around a mean with no potential outliers, therefore, the median is
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chosen as the consolidated escalation rate for each year. This process is completed for
the rest of the 5 contractors, the results of which is shown in Appendix B.

Contractor 1 Escalation Rates
2.430%
2.420%
2.410%
2.400%
2.390%
2.380%
2.370%
2.360%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
RATE CATEGORY
2018

2019

2020

Figure 2: Contractor 1 Escalation Rates
Next, the deviation of the GI forecasted escalation rates to each contractor’s
escalation rates are calculated using Equation 2 but substituting the contractor’s
escalation rate for 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 . These deviations are then plotted for each contractor to give a

visual comparison of the GI forecasts to what the contractors are assuming in their

contracts. A year-by-year deviation for each contractor is also provided in a table to
show the frequency of positive and negative deviations.
Change Point Analysis
To this point the accuracy of GI forecasts compared to actuals and contractor
FPRAs has been analyzed to provide evidence of the validity of utilizing GI forecasts as a
benchmark for EPAs. To gain a better understanding of whether GI forecasts are a valid
tool to base EPA payments, the historical values of PPI 336411 are analyzed for any
significant change points.
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Data and Data Sources
This section of the research uses the BLS managed historical PPI data. As
previously discussed, the focus is on the aircraft manufacturing PPI 336411.
Data Limitations
The BLS managed historical data of PPI 336411 date back to 1985 and is
documented monthly. The monthly values of the PPI are used, providing 384 data points.
Methodology
Finding significant changes can be a difficult task without a concrete measure of
what defines a significant change in a data set. Therefore, a change point analysis is
conducted on the historical values of PPI 336411. A change point analysis gives insight
into if and when, there is a significant change in the average of the data. If there is a
significant change in the data, then further research can be done to determine what factors
contributed to this shift. When a data set has significant shifts in the average, basing
future values of the data set on a forecasting model may not be advantageous because
other factors are influencing the data that may not be able to be predicted.
Determining the Range of Cumulative Sum Values
To begin the change point analysis, the historical values of PPI 336411 are
converted to a monthly escalation rate by calculating the percent change each month.
These escalation rates are then placed in a column next to the raw index values. The
average of these values is then calculated and titled 𝑥𝑥̅ . A second column is then created

to calculate the difference in each year’s escalation rate to the average escalation rate.

This column is titled x-𝑥𝑥̅ . The next step in the analysis is to calculate what is known as a
cumulative sum. A cumulative sum (CUMSUM) is a moving sum of the x-𝑥𝑥̅ values. The
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CUMSUM (𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 ) column starts with a 𝑆𝑆0 value of 0. Each subsequent 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 value is
calculated using Equation 3.

𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 = 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1+ (x-𝑥𝑥̅ )
Equation 3: CUMSUM
In Equation 3, 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 is the CUMSUM in time n, 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 is the CUMSUM in time n-1, x is the

escalation value in time n, and 𝑥𝑥̅ is the average of the escalation values from 1986 to

2017. Once all the 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 values are calculated, a range, or 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 , is calculated on the values.

The range calculation is shown in Equation 4. An example of these calculations is shown
in Table 4. Because there are 384 rows, only the first 40 are shown in Table 4.
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
Equation 4: Range
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Table 4: Change Point Variable Calculations
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

%
change
X-Xbar CUSUM
Sdiff
Date
PPI 336411
0.00%
0
17.86%
Dec-85
100
100.9
0.90%
0.67%
0.67%
Jan-86
Feb-86
-0.20%
-0.43%
0.24%
100.7
Mar-86
100.9
0.20%
-0.03%
0.21%
Apr-86
100.8
-0.10%
-0.33%
-0.12%
May-86
-0.40%
-0.63%
-0.74%
100.4
Jun-86
100.4
0.00%
-0.23%
-0.97%
Jul-86
100.5
0.10%
-0.13%
-1.10%
Aug-86
100.4
-0.10%
-0.33%
-1.43%
Sep-86
98.6
-1.79%
-2.02%
-3.45%
Oct-86
98.6
0.00%
-0.23%
-3.68%
Nov-86
98.6
0.00%
-0.23%
-3.91%
Dec-86
0.00%
-0.23%
-4.14%
98.6
Jan-87
0.91%
0.68%
-3.45%
99.5
Feb-87
0.60%
0.37%
-3.08%
100.1
Mar-87
0.40%
0.17%
-2.91%
100.5
Apr-87
100.0
-0.50%
-0.73%
-3.64%
May-87
99.2
-0.80%
-1.03%
-4.67%
Jun-87
99.3
0.10%
-0.13%
-4.79%
Jul-87
-0.40%
-0.63%
-5.43%
98.9
Aug-87
98.9
0.00%
-0.23%
-5.65%
Sep-87
0.00%
-0.23%
-5.88%
98.9
Oct-87
98.7
-0.20%
-0.43%
-6.31%
Nov-87
98.8
0.10%
-0.13%
-6.44%
Dec-87
-0.51%
-0.74%
-7.18%
98.3
Jan-88
99.7
1.42%
1.20%
-5.98%
Feb-88
0.20%
-0.03%
-6.01%
99.9
Mar-88
0.00%
-0.23%
-6.24%
99.9
Apr-88
100.8
0.90%
0.67%
-5.57%
May-88
0.10%
-0.13%
-5.70%
100.9
Jun-88
101.7
0.79%
0.56%
-5.13%
Jul-88
101.3
-0.39%
-0.62%
-5.76%
Aug-88
101.3
0.00%
-0.23%
-5.99%
Sep-88
102.4
1.09%
0.86%
-5.13%
Oct-88
102.6
0.20%
-0.03%
-5.16%
Nov-88
102.3
-0.29%
-0.52%
-5.68%
Dec-88
105.8
3.42%
3.19%
-2.49%
Jan-89
107.7
1.80%
1.57%
-0.93%
Feb-89
0.46%
0.24%
-0.69%
108.2
Mar-89
109.1
0.83%
0.60%
-0.09%
Apr-89
109.4
0.27%
0.05%
-0.04%
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Identifying Visual Shifts in the CUMSUM Chart
Next, the CUMSUM data is plotted on a graph to identify overarching shifts in
the slope of the data. There are points in the data where the slope changes, but it does not
cause a change in the overall trend in the data. These points are not identified as potential
change points. If the slope changes and causes a change in the trend of the data, then this
point is identified as a potential change point. After graphing the CUMSUM data,
analysis is conducted to mathematically determine if a change did in fact occur. This is
done through a process called bootstrapping.
Bootstrapping the Original CUMSUM Values
Bootstrapping is a process of randomly sampling with replacement from the
original data set, deriving a statistic from the randomized sample and comparing to the
original sample. In this case, one bootstrap sample is manually created, and then a
simulation is run with 10,000 iterations using @Risk software, effectively creating
10,000 bootstrap samples. An average is calculated for the sample. Then 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 values are
calculated for the sample and a 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 value is calculated for the bootstrap. The 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

𝑛𝑛
value of the bootstrap is then compared to the original 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 value. If 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 then

there is evidence to suggest there was a significant change in the average of the data in

𝑛𝑛
the given timeframe of 1986 to 2017. If 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
> 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 then there is not sufficient evidence

to suggest a significant change occurred in the average of the data from 1986 to 2017.

𝑛𝑛
For both situations, 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 is the range of the original data and 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
is the range of the

𝑛𝑛
bootstrapped data. From the simulation a distribution of the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
values are created and

the delimiters are adjusted so the right most delimiter is equal to the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 value of the
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original data set and the left most delimiter is on the far left of the distribution. This
𝑛𝑛
represents the frequency of when 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 . The resulting percentage between the

two delimiters is the empirical coverage of a change occurred in the given time frame.
The 𝛼𝛼 used is 0.05, so if the empirical coverage is greater than 95% then there is
significant evidence to suggest a change occurred between 1986 and 2017.
Sum Squared Error Estimator of Change Point

Once the range of times are identified where a change occurred in the average of
the data, an estimate of what month and year the change occurred is calculated. The
estimator used to identify the change point is Sum Squared Error (SSE). The formula
used to calculate SSE is shown in Equation 5.
𝑚𝑚

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑚𝑚) = �(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥̅1
𝑛𝑛=1

∑𝑚𝑚

)2

where

𝑥𝑥

384

+ � (𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥̅ 2 )2
𝑛𝑛=𝑚𝑚+1
∑384

𝑥𝑥

𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
𝑥𝑥̅1 = 𝑛𝑛=1
and 𝑥𝑥̅ 2 = 𝑛𝑛=𝑚𝑚+1
𝑛𝑛
384−𝑚𝑚
Equation 5: SSE Change Point Estimator

In Equation 5, 𝑚𝑚 represents the point at which it is determined there may be a

change point. 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 is the monthly escalation rate. 𝑥𝑥̅1 represents the average of the data

prior to point 𝑚𝑚 while 𝑥𝑥̅ 2 is the average of the data after point 𝑚𝑚. This equation breaks

the data into two segments on either side of the tested point and estimates the average of
each one of the segments. The point 𝑚𝑚 is then compared to the average of the two

segments. The value of 𝑚𝑚 that minimizes SSE is the best estimate of last point before a

change occurred (Taylor, 2000).

For the data set, three periods of time are identified as having potential change
points within them, 1986 to 1999, 1996 to 2005, and 2005 to 2017. A narrower period of
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time around each change point is then identified based on the CUMSUM chart depicted
in Figure 9 of Chapter 4. For the first change point within 1986 to 1999, the SSE values
from January 1995 (𝑚𝑚 = 109) to May 1997 (𝑚𝑚 = 137) are calculated. For the second
change point within 1996 to 2005, the SSE values from October 1998 (𝑚𝑚 = 154) to

March 2000 (𝑚𝑚 = 171) are calculated. For the third change point within 2005 to 2017,

the SSE values from September 2008 (𝑚𝑚 = 273) to July 2011 (𝑚𝑚 = 307) are calculated.
Within each one of these ranges, the minimum SSE are identified and this is the best
estimate for the change point within each range.
Retrospective EPA versus Prospective EPA (MAPE)
After the change point analysis is conducted, a retrospective approach to EPAs
was compared to the current prospective approach by comparing Mean Absolute Percent
Error (MAPE).
Data and Data Sources
This section of the research uses the BLS managed historical PPI data. As
previously discussed, the focus is on the aircraft manufacturing PPI 336411. IHS GI
forecasts of PPI 336411 are used as well.
Data Limitations
For each base year calculation of the MAPE, only 10 years from the specified
base year are used. MAPE values from base year 2000 to 2009 are calculated because
the year 2000 is identified as a change point in the historical data of PPI 336411 where
the inflation rates change from being below the average to above the average. 2009 is the
last base year used because there is only historical data through 2018 and with a 10-year
assumption from the base year, 2009 is the last year able to be used.
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Methodology
MAPE is a variable that measures the error of a forecast value to an actual value
in percentage terms. It is typically utilized to compare to forecasting techniques,
however, in this situation it is used to compare two approaches to EPA clauses.
The current approach is a prospective approach, which means EPA payments are
calculated based on changes in forecasts. If the current years forecast varies by a specific
threshold percentage from the established base year forecast, then an EPA may be
triggered. In the EPA clause referenced in Appendix A, a base year 2009 quarter 4
forecast of PPI 336411 is used, therefore, for the MAPE calculations, the same base
forecast is used. The retrospective approach is similar to the prospective approach,
however, instead of using forecasts, historical values are used. Specifically, a base year
of the historical index of PPI 336411 is chosen and this is compared to the current year of
the index. A ten-year period of performance for the purposes of the EPA clause is
assumed. Therefore, the base year of the forecast will be adjusted every ten years. Once
it is established which two methods are being compared, the MAPE for both are
calculated. The MAPE equation is shown in Equation 6.
1 |𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹|
� × 100
� 𝛴𝛴
|𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴|
𝑛𝑛
Equation 6: MAPE
For the MAPE calculation of the prospective approach, the 2009 quarter 4
forecast is the Actual value of the equation. The Forecast value used are the 2010-2017
quarter 4 forecast. The 2009 quarter 4 forecasts begin in 2009 and span to 2018. The
forecasts are then projected to 2027 using the current practice of maintaining the previous
years’ forecast escalation rate for all out years. This projection to 2027 is also done for
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the 2010-2017 quarter 4 forecasts. The MAPE for each quarter 4 forecast from 20102017 are then calculated and the average of the MAPEs during this time period is
calculated.
The MAPE of the 2009 quarter 4 forecasts to the historical index values of PPI
336411 is also calculated and compared to the MAPE of the retrospective approach
previously discussed.
Conclusion
This chapter detailed the methodologies for each research objective. With the
2011 AFLCMC study as a baseline to verify and compare research results, the validity of
the EPA clauses was analyzed by doing the following. First, the historical EPA amounts
were totaled in a tabular format to show the cost impact of EPAs in fixed price contracts.
Then the GI forecasts of PPI 336411 were compared to BLS actuals of the index to
determine the accuracy of the forecasts. Next the GI forecasts were compared to FPRA
derived labor escalation rates to determine if EPA payments have a portion already
assumed in the contract’s base price. Next, a change point analysis was conducted to
identify changes in the average of the historical data that may be effecting the accuracy of
the forecasts. Last, a MAPE value of the current prospective approach is compared to an
average MAPE from 2000-2009 of the retrospective approach. Also, the MAPE of the
2009 quarter 4 forecast as compared to the historical values of PPI 336411 is calculated.
The next chapter will discuss the results of the each of these methodologies as well as
interpret the findings.
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IV. Results and Analysis
Chapter Overview
Chapter 4 discusses the results of each research question as well as the relevance
of these results. The chapter provides answers to what historically is being paid to the
government and to the contractor in relation to EPAs, the accuracy of Global Insight (GI)
forecasts in comparison to actual values of PPI 336411, how Global Insight escalation
forecasts compare to what contractors are assuming in FPRAs, and if it is valid to base an
EPA clause on an index forecast.
Historical Economic Price Adjustments
Knowing how much is currently obligated due to EPAs is important as it gives
insight into a few pieces of data. The first is whether the EPA clause, as written, provides
equal protection to both the government and contractor. An EPA clause providing equal
protection should over the course of multiple years have close to equal instances of
upward and downward adjustments. Second, it provides insight into the cost impact of
EPAs.
Table 5 shows the total contract price, total obligated amount, and percent of
contract related to economic price adjustments separated by airframe. A negative amount
in the “Total Obligated Amount” column indicates a downward EPA, while a positive
value indicates an upward EPA. Out of the 266 aircraft contracts and modifications only
a total of 20 of the modifications are related to EPAs, which indicates EPAs are not as
pervasive as previously believed. Of these 20 modifications, 9 are downward
adjustments, which indicate money being returned to the government. This implies that
since 1981, the EPA clauses have provided equal protection to both government and
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contractor in times of unanticipated fluctuations in the aircraft manufacturing industry.
The total dollar value of the original contract price of the modifications is
$81,057,561,405, while the net obligated amount of the modifications is $693,636. This
represents 0.0009% of the overall contracts value. Based on this minimal amount being
paid in EPAs, EPAs do not have a significant cost impact to the Air Force on a net basis.
However, as shown in Table 5, division 2 has upward adjustments totaling $22,744,725.
As a percentage of the total contract price this is not a large amount, though this still
represents over $22M in incorrectly allocated money that could have been used for higher
priority items. This loss of obligation authority for other priorities represents the
opportunity cost of inaccurate forecasts.
Though the cost impact of EPAs is not large in comparison to the overall contract
values, there is something to be gained from further analysis. As will be discussed in
questions 2, 3, and 4, basing an economic adjustment payment off a change in a
forecasted index is not reflective of actual changes in the economy. Instead, if the EPA is
to reflect actual fluctuations in the market, it is appropriate to base the payment off how
much the current index value deviates from historical averages of the index.
Table 5: Economic Price Adjustment Amount by Aircraft
Division

1
2
3
4
5
Absolute Total
Net Total

Modification
Count

2
4
3
5
6
20
20

Total Contract Price

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

29,653,250,814
10,285,600,121
18,374,457,653
3,572,044,461
19,172,108,357
81,057,461,405
81,057,461,405
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Total Obligated
Amount (EPA)

Percent of
Contract

$
(7,475,916) -0.0252%
$ 22,744,725 0.2211%
$
52,862 0.0003%
$
(3,363,143) -0.0942%
$ (11,264,891) -0.0588%
$ 44,901,537 0.0554%
$
693,636 0.0009%

The overall contract price by airframe is then compared to the total EPA amount
obligated to determine if contract size has any influence on the EPA amount, positive or
negative. Figure 3 depicts a graph of the total contract price and obligated amount by
aircraft. Because the EPA amounts are so small in magnitude compared to the overall
contract values, the EPA obligated amounts are graphed separately in Figure 4 to show
how each airframe differs. The contract associated with division 1 has the greatest value
at $29.65B but ranks third out of the five airframes in terms of EPA amount. Contrary,
division 4 has the smallest contract value of $3.57B but ranks fourth out of five in EPA
magnitude. This is an indication that magnitude of the contract does not have an
influence on the magnitude of the EPA. Instead the magnitude and frequency of an EPA
is more likely influenced by the wording of the EPA and what assumptions the payment
is based on. These will be examined in research questions 2, 3, and 4.

TOTAL CONTRACT PRICE AND
OBLIGATED AMOUNT BY A/C
Total Contract Price

Total Obligated Amount (EPA)

$29,653,250,814
$18,374,457,653

$19,172,108,357

$10,285,600,121
$3,572,044,461
$52,862

$22,744,725
1
$(7,475,916)

2

3

4
$(3,363,143)

5
$(11,264,891)

Figure 3: Total Contract Price and Obligated Amount of EPA by Aircraft
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TOTAL OBLIGATED AMOUNT BY A/C
Total Obligated Amount (EPA)
$22,744,725

$52,862
1

2

3

$(7,475,916)

4
$(3,363,143)

5
$(11,264,891)

Figure 4: Total Obligated Amount of EPA by Aircraft
Global Insight Forecasts vs Historical Values
After determining that magnitude of contract does not influence magnitude or
frequency of EPA, the accuracy of the GI forecasts of PPI 336411 to actuals is examined.
Figure 5 shows the average forecast values of PPI 336411 along with the actuals. Based
on this graph it appears the forecasts fall well in line with the actual raw index values.
However, the EPA clause language does not rely on a forecast of the raw index value as a
determinant of payment. Instead it focuses on the escalation of the index. Therefore, the
average forecasted escalation rate versus the actual escalation rate is shown in Figure 6.
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Average GI Forecast vs Actual PPI 336411
250.0
230.0
210.0
190.0
170.0
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Average of GI Forecasts

BLS Actual

Figure 5: Actual vs Average Forecast (Raw Index Values)

Average GI Forecast Escalation vs Actual
Escalation
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Figure 6: Actual vs Average Forecast (Escalation Rates)
From the escalation graph it becomes clear the forecasted escalation is generally
in line with actual escalation from 2005 to 2008. After 2008 the forecasts begin to
deviate above and below actuals until around 2013 where they are steadily above actuals
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through 2017. To get a better visual of the magnitude of deviation of the forecasts from
the actuals, the deviation graph is depicted in Figure 7.

Average Deviation of GI Forecasts
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
Average Deviation

Figure 7: Average Deviation of Forecasts
The deviation graph further clarifies that the forecasted escalation rates deviate
and are below the actuals from 2005 to 2014 and above from 2014 to 2017. This means
since 2014 GI has over-estimated the escalation of PPI 336411. This is contrary to what
was initially explored in the 2011 study by AFLCMC which suggested GI forecasts are
generally underestimating the PPI. However, the original study explored the accuracy of
PPI 3364 Aerospace product and parts manufacturing which is the highest-level PPI in
the aerospace industry. Because the EPA clauses refer to PPI 336411 as the baseline for
adjustments, it is appropriate to analyze the accuracy of this index instead of the accuracy
of the higher-level index. A sensitivity analysis was also conducted comparing the
January, June, and December BLS values of PPI 336411 to GI forecasts. This resulted in
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similar trends of inaccuracies as when using the average BLS value. The graph of the
original study is shown in Figure 8.

>15% discrepancy
between Initial
Forecast and Index
actual for 2010

PPI Aircraft and Aircraft Parts Forecasts vs. Actual
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Figure 8: Forecast of PPI 3364 Raw Values vs Actuals (2011 AFLCMC Study)
To detail how each year’s forecast specifically deviates from the actuals Table 6
is provided. It depicts the deviation by year of the fourth quarter forecasts of escalation
to the actual escalation values managed by BLS. Red cells indicate when the GI forecasts
are below the actuals. The right-hand columns show the net total deviation and absolute
total deviation to give an indication of the overall accuracy of the GI insight forecasts to
the actuals. The bottom row is the average percent deviation of each given year.
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Table 6: Deviation of GI Escalation Forecasts to BLS Actuals
Q4 Forecast
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
Average

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

-0.02%

-0.31%

-0.83%
-0.02%

-2.54%
0.01%

-1.92%
0.05%
-0.02%

-1.12%
-0.66%
-1.21%

-2.97%
-0.31%
-4.17%
-0.01%

-3.09%
0.28%
-4.84%
-0.29%

-2.05%
-2.14%
-3.99%
0.13%
0.00%

-0.96%
-2.87%
-2.89%
1.06%
0.54%

0.54%
-2.13%
-1.10%
2.70%
2.19%
0.02%

-1.36%
-0.33%
3.78%
3.31%
-0.15%

-0.02%

-0.31%

-0.42%

-1.27%

-0.63%

-1.00%

-1.86%

-1.99%

-1.61%

-1.02%

0.37%

1.05%

2017

-0.15%
0.02%
4.88%
4.34%
0.83%
0.02%
1.66%

Net Percent
Deviation
2018
-15.27%
-9.30%
0.43%
-18.54%
5.71%
12.26%
5.12%
10.38%
1.69%
0.69%
0.22%
0.02%
2.63%
-4.42%

Based on this table, as well as the other graphics discussed in this section, it is
evident GI forecasts of PPI336411are generally inaccurate. Forecasts before 2009 have
negative net percent deviations which indicates they are below actuals, while forecasts
after 2009 have positive net percent deviations which indicate they are above actuals.
This general inaccuracy can be a result of a multitude of factors not directly related to the
aircraft manufacturing industry. Because there was a switch from underestimation to
overestimation in 2009, this may indicate a change point in the historical data which may
be causing inaccuracies as will be discussed in the change point analysis section of this
chapter. Additionally, this is further evidence the GI forecasts do not fully reflect the
state of the aircraft manufacturing industry. If EPA clauses are written to protect the
government and contractor of unanticipated changes in the market, but are based on
changes in forecasted values, then the EPA clauses are not accomplishing their goal and
EPA payments may not be indicative of market fluctuations.
Global Insight Forecasts vs Contractor FPRA Direct Labor Escalation
After examining how accurately the GI forecasts of PPI 336411 represent the
actual market, the accuracy of the forecasts to the direct labor component of the
contractor FPRA rates is examined. The results indicate not only are GI forecasts not a
truly accurate representation of the market fluctuations, but they deviate from
contractor’s direct labor rates as well.
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Absolute
Percent
Deviation
16.35%
9.97%
19.00%
18.57%
15.51%
2.69%
0.24%
15.84%

As discussed in Chapter 3, each FPRA had multiple rates to choose from in each
year. Therefore, to get one consolidated rate in each year, descriptive statistics are
calculated for each year’s rates to determine if the mean or median is more appropriate
for said year. The median was chosen for all rates, as this was the most representative
rate for skewed distributions and random distributions. Table 7 shows the consolidated
escalation rate chosen for each contractor in each year from the FPRA.
Table 7: FPRA Escalation Rates by Contractor
Contractor 1
Contractor 2
Contractor 3
Contractor 4
Contractor 5
Contractor 6

2015

2.73%

2016

2.96%

2017

2.84%

2018
2.40%
3.00%
3.17%
2.60%
2.06%
2.82%

2019
2.40%
3.00%
2.31%
2.60%
2.00%
2.82%

2020
2.40%
3.00%
2.48%
2.13%
2.82%

2021
2.99%
2.17%
2.82%

Table 8 shows the total deviation of the GI forecasts from each contractor’s
escalation rates. The empty cells indicate where escalation data is not available from the
contractor FPRA. The table is conditionally formatted to show whether the GI forecasts
are below the contractor rates. Of the 32 observed comparisons, 24 of the GI forecasts
are below the contractor rates. Though only 6 contractors are compared, these 6
contractors make up a majority of prime contractors for ACAT I aircraft programs. With
forecasts being consistently lower than the contractor assumptions, the government is
more likely to be paying an upward EPA for a change in escalation the contractor already
has assumed within the FPRA. A scenario is spelled out below to better explain this
potential double payment situation.

52

A contractor’s FPRA has labor escalation of 3.0%, while the baseline GI forecast
of PPI 336411 spelled out in the EPA clause is 200. The EPA clause has an upper
minimum threshold to trigger an EPA payment of 2.0%. If the current years forecast is
greater than 204 (a 2.0% increase from 200), then an upward EPA payment is triggered.
Meanwhile, the contractor already accounted for at least 3.0% escalation, but will receive
an EPA payment regardless.
Table 8: Total Deviation of GI Forecasts to FPRAs by Contractor
Contractor
Contractor 1
Contractor 2
Contractor 3
Contractor 4
Contractor 5
Contractor 6

2005

2007

-0.130%

-1.330%

2009
-0.203%
-1.401%
-1.070%
-1.930%
0.545%
-1.040%

2011
0.498%
-0.777%
-0.512%
-0.531%
1.800%
-1.124%

2013
0.071%
-1.047%
-0.938%
-0.794%
1.222%
-1.703%

2015
0.847%
-0.625%
-0.163%
-3.315%
2.267%
-0.658%

Total
2017
-0.578% 0.634%
-1.955% -5.805%
-1.587% -4.270%
-5.468% -13.498%
0.610% 6.445%
-2.314% -6.840%

A graphical representation of the deviation of GI forecasts to Contractor 2 is
shown in Figure 9. As is shown, GI is consistently lower than the contractor rates.
Though not all the observed contractors are consistently above the GI forecasts, a
majority of the GI comparison points across all contractors deviate negatively from the
contractor rates. As is shown, contractor 5 shows all positive deviations, meaning GI
forecasts were above what was found in the FPRA. Though this stands out as an
anomaly compared to other contractors, there was nothing about this specific contractor
that would indicate lower FPRA escalation rates would be expected. The other 5
contractor graphics are shown in Appendix B. As was previously discussed, if forecasts
are consistently lower than contractor escalation and an EPA is triggered, that EPA is
more likely to be a double payment of escalation already assumed in the base price of the
contract. Next, the results of the change point analysis are discussed.
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Figure 9: GI Forecast Deviation from Contractor 2 FPRA
Change Point Analysis
After determining the GI forecasts accuracy to actuals and contractor FPRAs, a
change point analysis is conducted on historical values of PPI 336411 to determine if
basing the EPA clause off a forecast is appropriate. The change point analysis identifies
ranges of time where there are significant changes in the average of the data. If there are
significant changes in the average of the historical data, then forecasting future values
becomes difficult if not near impossible to do so relatively accurately. The GI forecasts
are based on the historical values of the index which may be heavily influenced by
outside factors, as indicated by a change point.
The first step in the change point analysis is identifying time periods where there
are potential changes in the average. The cumulative sum chart in Figure 10 depicts
where potential changes in the average of the escalation rate occurred. The cumulative
sum is the cumulative sum of the deviations of the observed values from the average of
the observations. A period where there is a positive slope on the graph indicates the
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values during that time tend to be above the average. Likewise, a period where there is a
negative slope indicates a time when values tend to be below the average. Therefore, a
sudden change in the slope resulting in a change in the overall trend of the data is
identified as a potential change point. There are 3 potential change points identified.

CUMSUM
12.00%
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
0.00%
-2.00%
-4.00%

Jan-86
Jun-87
Nov-88
Apr-90
Sep-91
Feb-93
Jul-94
Dec-95
May-97
Oct-98
Mar-00
Aug-01
Jan-03
Jun-04
Nov-05
Apr-07
Sep-08
Feb-10
Jul-11
Dec-12
May-14
Oct-15
Mar-17

2.00%

-6.00%
-8.00%
-10.00%

Figure 10: Cumulative Sum Chart
As shown in Figure 10, there are potential change points from 1993 to 1996, 1997
to 2000, and 2007 to 2010. However, first the entire range of data is bootstrapped to
determine if at least 1 of these 3 change points flags as statistically significant before
narrowing the analysis. Figure 11 depicts the empirical coverage from 1986 to 2017 that
a change occurs.
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Figure 11: Empirical Coverage of Change Occurring from 1986 to 2017
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
Figure 11 shows the distribution of the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
values. As discussed in Chapter 3 the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

values are the range of the bootstrapped data which is then compared to the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 of the
𝑛𝑛
original data set. The x-axis represents the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
value while the y-axis represents

frequency. The 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 of the original data is located at the top of the graph on the right

𝑛𝑛
most end of the delimiter. The frequency of simulation iterations where 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 is

then tested against an α of 0.05. Figure 11 suggests that with 99.9% empirical coverage a
change occurs between 1986 and 2017 based on an α of 0.05. This indicates that further
investigation is required to better pinpoint when the changes occur. To identify the time
periods where a change potentially occur, the graph of the CUMSUM values of the
original data set are analyzed. The chart is shown in Figure 10. To verify that changes
did occur during these time frames with greater confidence, the same procedure for a
change point analysis explained previously is conducted from 1986 to 1996, 1996 to
2017, and 1996 to 2005, the results of which are provided next.
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The results of the first bootstrapping range from 1986-1999 are shown in Figure
𝑛𝑛
12. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, if 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 , then there is statistical

evidence a change occurs in the time frame. Figure 12 illustrates 99.7% of the time

𝑛𝑛
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 which verifies with 99.7% empirical coverage there is a change in the

average of the escalation rate between 1986 and 1999. Based on the 𝛼𝛼 of 0.05, this is

significant evidence a change occurs in the escalation rate during this time frame.

Figure 12: Empirical Coverage 1986-1999
The results of the bootstrapping 1996 to 2005 are shown in Figure 13. Out of
𝑛𝑛
10,000 bootstraps of the data, 9,990 of the iterations resulted in a 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
<

𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 . Therefore, with 99.9% empirical coverage, a change occurs in the average of the
escalation rate between 1996 and 2005. Based on an 𝛼𝛼 of 0.05, this is significant

evidence a change occurs in the average of the escalation rate.
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Figure 13: Empirical Coverage 1996-2005
The results of the bootstrapping from 2005 to 2017 are shown in Figure 14.
Again, 10,000 bootstraps are conducted and a total of 9,950 of the bootstraps result in a
𝑛𝑛
< 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 . This means with 99.5% empirical coverage a change in the average of the
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

escalation rate occurs between 2005 and 2017. Using an 𝛼𝛼 of 0.05, this is significant

evidence that a change in the average did occur.
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Figure 14: Empirical Coverage 2005-2017
Next the estimates of when the changes in the average of the data occurred are
identified. As discussed in Chapter 3, each bootstrapped time period was further
narrowed down based on the CUMSUM chart in Figure 10. From January 1995 to May
1997, the point with the minimum SSE was February 1995 (𝑚𝑚 = 110) with an SSE of

0.00597. From 1996 to 2005, the point with the minimum SSE was October 1998 (𝑚𝑚 =

154) with an SSE of 0.00643. From September 2008 to July 2011, the point with the

minimum SSE was February 2009 (𝑚𝑚 = 278) with an SSE of 0.00651. All these points

are identified as change points. They are then verified by looking back at the raw data to
see if there are significant changes. For the first change point, the escalation rate drops
from 1.26% in January 1995 to 0.15% in February 1995. This indicates a significant
change in the average of the data. For the second change point the escalation rate begins
at 0.07% in October 1998 and promptly increases to 0.21% in December 1998. This
verifies a change point did in fact occur. For the last change point, the escalation rate
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drops from 0.29% in February 2009 to -1.24% in March 2009. This indicates a change
point did occur.
The results of this research question verify 3 time periods of change in the
average of the historical PPI data; 1986-1999, 1999-2005, and 2005-2017. These
changes are potentially caused by factors not directly related to the aircraft manufacturing
industry, and hence make it difficult to accurately forecast future values of the PPI, recall
the results of research question 2 which concluded GI forecasts are generally inaccurate
When basing an EPA clause on changes in forecasts of a baseline index, the error of the
forecast is inherently included in the value of the EPA. As discussed in Chapter 2,
Defense Acquisition Regulations section PGI 216.203-4 spells out the details of how to
correctly write an EPA clause, but it does not mandate whether this clause should be
based on historical values of the PPI or forecasts of the PPI. Therefore, it may be more
advantageous to base the EPA payments on how the current PPI value compares to
historical averages of the index (retrospective EPA), than basing the EPA on changes in
forecasts of the index (prospective EPA).
Retrospective EPA vs Prospective EPA Clause (MAPE)
After identifying the change points in the historical data, the MAPE of the current
prospective approach is calculated. This produces 8 MAPE values because the 2009
quarter 4 forecast is compared to the 2010-2017 quarter 4 forecasts. An average of these
MAPEs is calculated which is 7.0%. This MAPE is then compared to the proposed
retrospective approach. The MAPEs using 2000-2009 base years to the current year are
calculated using the historical index escalation rates of PPI 336411. The year 2000 is
chosen as this identified as a change point in the data as previously discussed. 2009 is an
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end year, because a 10-year period of performance is used. There are only historical
index values up to 2018, so the last base year able to be used is 2009. An average of the
MAPEs from 2000-2009 is then calculated which is 47%.
Comparing the current prospective approach to the proposed retrospective
approach, it is clear the current prospective approach produces a lower MAPE. However,
as it has been previously illustrated, the GI forecasts are not reflective of the economy,
there is error. Because the current EPA payments are solely based on changes in GI
forecasts, there is inherent error in the EPA payments. To make the EPA payments more
representative of changes in the economy, the proposed retrospective approach should be
used. To show the retrospective approach is more reflective of the economy than the GI
forecasts, the MAPE of the 2009 quarter 4 forecast to the historical values of PPI 336411
is calculated, which is 60%. By utilizing the retrospective approach instead of the
prospective approach, the MAPE decreases from 60% to an average of 47% from 20002009. It is unknown at this point how taking this retrospective approach will change the
EPAs being paid, however, the retrospective approach will allow the EPAs to capture
actual changes in the economy, not in forecasts.
Conclusion
This chapter summarized the results of the research. First, the historical EPAs
were categorized by aircraft and totaled to detail what cost impact these adjustments
have. Out of 266 contracts dating back to a 1982 award date, 20 modifications were
found related to EPAs. The net total amount obligated of these adjustments totaled
$693,636 out of a total of $81,057,461,405 worth of contracts. This indicates EPAs since
1982 have made up 0.0009% of all contracts from the ConWrite database. Though a cost
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impact of 0.0009% of all contracts is not a significant amount, there is an instance of a
single EPA reaching $22,744,725 which represents a loss of obligation authority for
higher priority items on contract. The accuracy of the GI forecasts of PPI 336411 is then
analyzed as compared to BLS actuals. The results indicate since 2013 forecasts have
deviated consistently above actuals. This is contrary to the original 2011 study which
looked at the accuracy of top-level PPI 3364 and suggested GI forecasts of said index
tended to be below actuals. A total net percent deviation of -4.42% from the actuals and
typical upper and lower thresholds for EPA payments of 2.0%, indicates the forecasts do
not accurately reflect the aircraft manufacturing industry, and the EPA modifications
currently occurring may be mitigated if they were not based on forecast changes.
After determining GI forecasts are not reflective of the aircraft manufacturing
market, the GI forecasts were compared to contractor FPRA labor escalation rates. The
results showed GI forecasts consistently below contractor escalation rates which could
result in double payment of escalation impacts already assumed by the contractor and
therefore unneeded. It is unclear what the value of the EPA payments fall into this
category, however, if EPAs continue to be based on changes in inaccurate forecasts rather
than changes in actuals, then the probability of an double payment will remain.
Lastly, it is determined through a change point analysis there are three periods of
time where there are significant changes in the average of the historical data of PPI
336411. This is a probable reason why the GI forecasts deviate from what is occurring in
the index. These changes may be caused by factors not directly related to the aircraft
manufacturing industry, and hence are difficult to forecast. With 3 change points over
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the last 32 years, it is likely more will occur in the future that will not be accounted for in
future forecasts.
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V. Conclusion and Recommendation
Chapter Overview
This chapter summarizes the results and conclusions drawn from the research
conducted. Each research question is answered and given context to the overall
recommendation.
Research Questions Answered
The overarching research objective of this thesis was to evaluate the validity of
Global Insight (GI) forecasts as a benchmark for EPA payments of current EPA clauses
pertaining to firm fixed price contracts of ACAT I aircraft programs. This was an
expansion on a study conducted in 2011 by AFLCMC on EPAs in fixed price contracts.
The research objective was accomplished answering six research questions.
Historical Economic Price Adjustments
The first research question examines what was historically paid for Economic
Price Adjustments. Data derived from the ConData database was utilized to determine a
total amount obligated for EPAs by airframe since 1981. This was a new addition to the
previous AFLCMC study as no analysis was done on what cost impact EPAs historically
have. Based on 2008 Inspector General (IG) report that examined DoD multiyear
contracts of the C-17, F/A-18, and the AH-64D, it was determined Boeing contracts for
these three airframes experienced significant price increases of around $1.9 billion due to
EPAs (IG report, 2008). Because this $1.9 billion in adjustments was not included in the
ConData database, this represents a limitation of the data and the ConData may be an
underestimation of EPAs. This research found EPAs have a very small cost impact in
relation to total contract value. Of all the contracts and modifications in the database,
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EPA modifications made up 0.043% of the total. Of the 20 EPA modifications, 0.055%
of the original contract value was represented by adjustments from these modifications.
Though it is a seemingly insignificant amount, there is potentially still cost savings to be
realized by rewording the EPA clauses.
Also, out of a total of 20 EPA contracts, 16 were non-zero, of which, 9 were of
negative value and 7 were of positive value. This indicates the EPA clauses are resulting
in a somewhat even split between upward and downward adjustments, with slightly more
downward adjustments. The EPA clauses are created to provide equal and unbiased
protection to both the government and the contractor in times of economic uncertainty.
The split of upward and downward adjustments illustrates the EPA clauses are
succeeding in this goal.
Global Insight Forecasts vs Historical Values
The second research question compared the accuracy of Global Insight forecasts
to BLS historical values of PPI 336411. Of the 13 years of forecasts available, only the
years of 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017 were compared to actuals, as 7
forecasts was viewed as a valid amount to determine general accuracy.
Including forecasts dating back to 2005, GI tends to forecast escalation of PPI
336411 above actuals tracked by Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS). The average net
total deviation of the GI forecasts was -4.42% which represents a large amount as
historical escalation of PPI 336411 averages only 2.71%. This is shown in Table 6.
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Table 6: Deviation of GI Escalation Forecasts to BLS Actuals

Additionally, the purpose of an EPA is to provide equal protection to both
government and contractor from unanticipated changes in the market. With forecasts
deviating from actuals by -4.42%, EPA payments based on these forecasts may not
represent actual market fluctuations and hence the EPA clause may not be accomplishing
its goal.
Global Insight Forecasts vs Contractor FPRA Direct Labor Escalation
The third research question examined how GI forecasts compare to escalation
rates manifested in contractor forward pricing rate agreements (FPRA). A total of 6
contractor FPRAs were analyzed to determine how their direct labor escalation rates
compare to GI forecasts of escalation. These 6 top government contractors were chosen
because of data availability, but the names of the contractors were excluded to limit the
release of proprietary information. The conclusion was GI forecasts were consistently
lower than direct labor escalation values derived from the FPRAs. This is shown in
Table 8.
Table 8: Total Deviation of GI Forecasts to FPRAs by Contractor
Contractor
Contractor 1
Contractor 2
Contractor 3
Contractor 4
Contractor 5
Contractor 6

2005

2007

-0.06%

-1.19%

2009
-0.20%
-1.40%
-1.07%
-1.95%
0.55%
-1.04%

2011
0.50%
-0.78%
-0.51%
-0.55%
1.80%
-1.13%
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2013
0.07%
-1.05%
-0.94%
-0.82%
1.22%
-1.71%

2015
0.85%
-0.63%
-0.16%
-3.34%
2.27%
-0.66%

2017
-0.58%
-1.95%
-1.59%
-5.49%
0.61%
-2.32%

Total
0.65%
-5.81%
-4.27%
-13.40%
6.44%
-6.86%

This underestimation is likely to lead to an EPA payment already assumed in the base
price of the contract.
Change Point Analysis
The fourth research question analyzed the historical data of PPI 336411 to find
any significant change points in the data. The method used to identify change point dates
utilized Sum Squared Error (SSE) and can be narrowed down to a specific month and
year of change. To answer this question, a change point analysis was conducted on three
time periods where there was a suspected change in the average of the historical values of
PPI 336411, 1986-1999, 1999-2005, and 2005-2017. From these time periods using
simulation and an SSE change point estimator, it was determined change points occurred
in February 1995, October 1998, and February 2009. These change points may be caused
by factors unrelated to the aircraft manufacturing industry and could be an explanation
for the forecasting GI forecasting inaccuracy.
Retrospective versus Prospective EPA Clause (MAPE)
The fifth research question compared the Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE)
of the current approach to EPAs to a proposed retrospective approach. Based on the EPA
clause in Appendix A, the current approach is a prospective approach, which means EPA
payments are calculated based on changes in forecasts. If the current years forecast
varies by a specific threshold percentage from the established base year forecast, then an
EPA may be triggered. The retrospective approach being recommended instead uses
historical values of PPI 336411. Specifically, a base year of the historical index of PPI
336411 is chosen and this is compared to the current year of the index. A ten-year period
of performance for the purposes of the EPA clause was assumed. Therefore, the base
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year of the forecast is adjusted every ten years. For the prospective approach, 8 MAPE
values were calculated, utilizing the 2009 quarter 4 forecasts as the base year forecast and
comparing to 2010-2017 quarter 4 forecasts. These 8 values were then consolidated to an
average MAPE of 13%. For the retrospective approach, 10 MAPE values were
calculated using 2000-2009 as the base year index values. These 10 MAPEs were then
consolidated into one average MAPE of 47%.
Though the current prospective approach results in a lower average MAPE than
the proposed retrospective approach, because the prospective approach relies solely on
forecasts, any EPA payment calculated from this will inherently contain elements of
forecast error. This results in EPA payments not representative of market changes.
Therefore, the retrospective approach should still be used as it results in an average 47%
MAPE compared to actuals while the prospective approach results in a 60% MAPE when
compared to actuals.
Recommendations
Based on the frequency and magnitude of historical EPA modifications, no
change is recommended to the current upper and minimum thresholds in the EPA clauses
to trigger an EPA payment. These EPAs make up a very small portion of total contract
value and are acceptably split between upward and downward adjustments, which
indicates equal protection to government and contractor. The 2008 IG report suggested
that there were large sums of unwarranted EPAs being paid to Boeing due to
contributions from Boeing to their pension plan heavily influencing the value of the index
being tracked for purposes of EPAs. However, based on the current study, it is clear
these large EPA payments are not pervasive DoD wide.
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Based on the two EPA clauses examined, the early lots of production have
between a 2-2.5% upper and lower threshold of deviation of the baseline forecast to the
current year forecast. As discussed in Chapter 4, if the current year forecast deviates
from the baseline forecast by more than these threshold percentages, then an EPA is
triggered. Because historically, EPAs make up a small percentage of overall contract
expenses, there is currently no need to change the upper and lower threshold percentage
recommendations for the EPA clauses.
Through the research not only was it discovered GI forecasts are inaccurate and
hence not reflective of the aircraft manufacturing industry, forecasts are consistently
below direct labor escalation derived from FPRAs, and there are 3 historical changes in
the average of the BLS managed actuals of PPI 336411. These 3 results are an indication
that basing the EPA payments on changes in forecast is bound to lead to EPA payments
not reflective of the current market. As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, there are 2
types of EPA clauses, retrospective and prospective. The most common type,
retrospective, are written to adjust contract price by analyzing cost from a given point and
looking back historically at what has occurred. The less used type, prospective, are
written to adjust contract prices in the future using forecasts. Prospective EPAs in their
current use are not reflective of market fluctuations. With inaccurate forecasts of the
price index, a retrospective EPA is more suitable. A retrospective clause ensures there is
no forecasting inaccuracies effecting the contingency payment, and establishes more
appropriate parameters for an adjustment indicative of market price fluctuations.
Therefore, for fixed price contracts with EPA, any adjustment should be based on
changes in tracked actuals of the index rather than changes in forecasts of the index.
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Significance of Results
This research provided evidence that prospective EPA clauses are based on
inaccurate forecasts and hence are not reflective of the economy. Utilizing a
retrospective approach, where an established base year of the historical index is
compared to the current year of the index to calculate the EPA, is recommended over the
current approach. Though the exact cost impact of this change is unclear, it is clear the
change will result in EPA payments more reflective of current market fluctuations and
therefore will better accomplish the EPA clause goal of providing equal protection to
both the government and contractor in long term contracts when upward and downward
fluctuations in the market are anticipated. Changing to using retrospective EPA clauses
in place of prospective EPA clauses could potentially result in more obligation authority
being returned to the government from unwarranted or inaccurate EPAs.
Future Research
The opportunity to expand on this research is prevalent in a few areas. More EPA
clauses should be analyzed to see if there are any trends in the way they are written for
specific airframes. Actual EPA calculations could be derived from multiyear contracts to
determine the exact cost impact of current EPAs as well. Also, other methods of
implementing a retrospective EPA clause can be explored. Lastly, the cost impact of
adjusting the EPA clauses to a retrospective approach must be analyzed to see what
potential cost savings there will be.
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Summary
This research examined the efficacy of using GI forecasts as a basis of calculating
EPA payments on fixed price contracts. It was determined GI forecasts are inaccurate
when compared to actuals and when compared to FPRA escalation rates. Not only is this
causing error in the EPA payments with regards to what is actually happening in the
economy, but also there is a potential double payment happening as the contractor is
assuming higher escalation than GI. A change point analysis was then conducted and it
was determined there were 3 historical change points in the PPI 336411 data that may be
inhibiting the accuracy of GI forecasts. This evidence suggested a retrospective approach
to calculating the EPA payments was warranted over the current prospective approach.
This was further verified as the proposed retrospective approach produced a lower MAPE
with regards to actual PPI values compared to the GI forecasts.
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Appendix A: EPA Clauses
836 AESG/H025 ECONOMIC PRICE ADJUSTMENT FOR NOT-TO-EXCEED (NTE) OPTION
PRICES
LOTS 3 - 13 (FEB 2010)
(a) The provisions of this EPA clause provide for both price increases and decreases to protect
the
Government and the contractor from the effects of economic changes as specified by the indices
and the
bands as specified in this clause. It shall be the intent of the parties to accomplish any adjustment
authorized by this clause prior to the exercise of Option Items subject to this clause. The
contractor shall
notify the Contracting Officer in writing not later than 7 calendar days prior to the scheduled
Option
exercise date of an Option Item (0301, 0302, 0401, 0402, 0501, 0502, 0601, 0602, 0701, 0702,
0801,
0802, 0901, 0902, 1001, 1002, 1101, 1102, 1201, 1202, 1301 and 1302) if an increase or
decrease in the
applicable Item's Not-To-Exceed (NTE) is warranted pursuant to the terms of this clause. The
Contractor
shall submit the Costs Subject to Adjustment (CSTA) and Costs Not Subject to Adjustment
(CNSTA)
amounts for each item, Aircraft and Warranty. The CSTA and the CNSTA shall be in the same
relative
proportion as the CSTA and the CNSTA for the proposal to definitize the NTE. The total CSTA
plus
CNSTA for each option item must equal the proposed NTE price calculated from Section J,
Attachment 7
for the Aircraft and set forth in Attachment 9, for the Warranty. The economic price adjustment for
the
option item NTE shall be accomplished in accordance with the procedure detailed in paragraph
(g). The
Contractor's proposal for an adjustment shall include supporting data, in the form required by the
Contracting Officer, explaining the calculation; and amount of the increase or decrease.
(b) Promptly after the Contracting Officer receives the notice and data under paragraph (a) of this
clause,
the Contracting Officer and the Contractor shall negotiate an adjustment to the Option Item's NTE
amount
and update the Option Item's NTE Aircraft unit prices in Section J, Attachment 7; and Warranty
price in
Section J, Attachment 9. Failure of the parties to agree on a requested adjustment under this
clause shall
NOT affect the Government's right to unilaterally exercise its rights pursuant to Special Contract
Requirement H013.
(c) Adjustments under this clause, if any, shall be based upon the formula specified in Paragraph
(g)
below. CSTA amounts are subject to either upward or downward adjustments. The CNSTA
amounts
include depreciation, cost of money, royalties, leases, data, fixed price subcontracts which do not
contain
EPA clauses, and profit. Proposed profit included in the NTEs shall not be subject to economic
price
adjustment.
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(d) IHS Global Insight, Inc.'s index PPI336411 Aircraft (Dec 1985=100) shall be used as the
standard of
measurement for this clause.
(e) The following rules shall apply in making numeric calculations under this clause:
(1) Round decimals to 4 decimal places;
(2) Round dollar calculations to the nearest whole dollar;
(3) Round up numbers equal to or greater than 5;
(4) Round down numbers less than or equal to 4;
PART I - THE SCHEDULE
SECTION H - SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS
SECTION H FA8625-10-R-6600
PAGE 55 OF 81

(5) Round percentages to 2 decimal places (e.g. 3.47%).
(f) For purposes of calculating the adjustments required by this clause, the following projected
average
annual index rates shall apply. The source of the baseline projected indices shown below is IHS
Global
Insight's 4th Quarter 2009 forecast. For years beyond 2019, the last data point of escalation will
be
projected at the same rate (straight-lined) on an annual basis through the final NTE period of
performance. Table 1 reflects the index and the projected index based on IHS Global Insight
PPI336411
Aircraft (Dec 1985 = 100).
Table 1 - Baseline Projected Average Annual Index Rates
Projected Time Period (Dec 1985=100)
Index Rate
CY2015 228.9 (3.0%)
CY2016 234.5 (2.4%)
CY2017 238.8 (1.8%)
CY2018 244.1 (2.2%)
CY2019 250.1 (2.4%)
CY2020 256.1 (2.4%)
CY2021 262.2 (2.4%)
CY2022 268.5 (2.4%)
CY2023 274.9 (2.4%)
CY2024 281.5 (2.4%)
CY2025 288.3 (2.4%)
CY2026 295.2 (2.4%)
CY2027 302.3 (2.4%)
CY2028 309.6 (2.4%)
(g) The economic price adjustment shall be calculated as follows:
(1) The contractor shall obtain IHS Global Insight's current projected annual index values for the
above projected time periods. For FY NTE values, use the same CY index values, for example
NTE FY
2022 will use CY 2022 index values.
(2) Divide this current projected annual index by the baseline projected average annual index rate
identified in paragraph (f) above for that particular year;
(3) Subtract 1 from this result and multiply the resulting answer by 100;
(4) Adjustment for Lots 3 - 5: If the resulting value is greater than or equal to +2.5%, calculate the
upward adjustment by multiplying the result by the proposed CSTA dollar amount. If the resulting
value is
between - 2.5% and +2.5%, do not calculate an adjustment. If the resulting value is less than or
equal to 2.5%, calculate the downward adjustment by multiplying the result by the CSTA dollar value
proposed.
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(5) Adjustment for Lots 6 - 13: If the resulting value is greater than or equal to +1.00%, calculate
the upward adjustment by multiplying the result by the proposed CSTA dollar amount. If the
resulting
value is between -1.00% and +1.00%, do not calculate an adjustment. If the resulting value is
less than
or equal to -1.00%, calculate the downward adjustment by multiplying the result by the proposed
CSTA
dollar value.
(h) Notional Computation worksheet:
Example calculation for Lots 3 - 5:
Example 1
CY2020
Example 2
CY 2020
Example 3
CY2020
STEP FORMULA RESULT RESULT RESULT
1 Global Insight's Projected Annual Index (7 days prior
to option exercise) (Example)
248.5 252.5 265.5
PART I - THE SCHEDULE
SECTION H - SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS
SECTION H FA8625-10-R-6600
PAGE 56 OF 81

2 Baseline Projected Average Annual Index Rate from
paragraph (f) Table 1
256.1 256.1 256.1
3 Divide Step 1 by Step 2 and round to 4 decimal
places
.9703 .9859 1.0367
4* Subtract 1 from Step 3 and multiply by 100 to
convert to %
-2.97% -1.41% 3.67%
5 Input applicable CSTA value for aircraft and engines
from the annual EPA proposal
$3.0B $3.0B
6 Adjustment (Multiply Step 5 by Step 4) -$89.1M $110.1M
7 Applicable NTE Price (annual EPA proposal) $3.5B $3.5B
8 Adjusted NTE Price $3.4109B No Change $3.6101B
* If the resulting value is between -2.50% and +2.50%, no adjustment will be calculated;
therefore, do not
proceed to Step 5.
EXAMPLE 1: The EPA adjustment is a $89,100,000 decrease in the NTE Price.
EXAMPLE 2: There is no EPA adjustment since the trigger band was not exceeded.
EXAMPLE 3: The EPA adjustment is a $110,100,000 increase in the NTE Price.
(i) Once an adjustment to an eligible Item's NTE amount has been accomplished under this
clause, or a
determination made that no adjustment is permitted pursuant to paragraph (g)(4) above, said
Item shall
not be subject to further Economic Price Adjustment.
(j) In the event the IHS Global Insight Indices used are discontinued; or if IHS Global Insight
suspends
publication of an index identified in paragraph (d) above or significantly alters the method of
calculating
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the index, the parties shall agree upon an appropriate substitute index for use under this clause. If
the
parties cannot agree on a substitute or comparable index within 90 calendar days after an index
has been
discontinued or altered in method of calculation, the Contracting Officer may, acting unilaterally
and
subject to Contractor appeal in accordance with paragraph (k) below, either adopt the IHS Global
Insight
index as altered or establish a new index.
(k) Any dispute arising under or related to the terms and/or procedures set forth in the foregoing
paragraphs shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions of this contract's Disputes clause.
(End of Clause)

AFMC CLAUSE CONTROL
C-5 RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENTS AND RE-ENGINING PROGRAM
(RERP)
LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION (LRIP)
FA8625-07-C-6471

CONTRACT NUMBER: H-128
CLAUSE TITLE: Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) for Lots 4 – 7 Not-to-Exceed
Prices
CLAUSE DATE: Jan 08
CATEGORY:
 One-time Use Provision/Clause

UNIFORM CONTRACT FORMAT SECTION: Section H
APPLICABLE FAR PART/SUBJECT AREA: FAR Part 16
INITIATOR’S NAME: Vicki A. Fry

PHONE: 255-1054
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RATIONALE FOR DETERMINATION OF CATEGORY: Clause applies only to
subject contract for LRIP for C-5 RERP.

JUSTIFICATION: Per SAF/AQ direction, the Contracting Officer is definitizing terms
and conditions for Lots I through III of LRIP and is capturing Not-to-Exceed (NTE)
prices for Lots I through VII. Clause H-127 captures the NTE amounts for Lots I through
VII. It is the intent of the Parties to definitize FFP option prices for Lots I through III in
February 2008; negotiations have been on-going through the IPT Pricing process and the
Contractor has submitted a TINA-compliant proposal for Lots I through III. The
Contractor adamantly requires the attached EPA clause to afford protection from unusual
inflation over the long-term contract for Lots IV through VII. The clause would provide
for adjustment only to the NTE amounts. Definitization of FFP prices for each lot then
would be based on TINA-compliant proposals. The Contractor has a long-term
arrangement with the engine supplier for all lots and the arrangement includes provisions
for EPA as established in Clause H-125 of subject contract. The clause indicates that it is
not anticipated that the FFP prices, once definitized, would be subject to further EPA
with the exception for the engines. The clause states, however, that should it be
determined during negotiations of definitive FFP amounts that further EPA is required,
the FFP as adjusted shall not exceed the established NTE amounts. It is noted that the
NTE amounts cited within the clause are subject to further review by the 716 AESG.
Changes to the text of the clause, however, are not anticipated absent further direction
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during the review and clearance process. A separate determination and finding will be
accomplished as required by FAR to document use of this EPA clause.

Communication concerning the negotiation of this clause is documented at Attachment 1.

The undersigned contracting officer has determined that the attached clause language
does not duplicate or deviate from the FAR and FAR Supplements and is necessary for
use in the subject contractual document.

____________________________________________ __________________________
VICKI A. FRY

DATE

Contracting Officer
716 AESG
255-1054

_____________________________________________ __________________________
Legal Office Coordination

Date
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CONTROL NUMBER: (assigned by COCO) Not Applicable

Not Applicable__________________________________________________________
COCO Approval (for Contractor/Program Unique Provision/Clause)
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Date

CLAUSE:

H128 ECONOMIC PRICE ADJUSTMENT (EPA) FOR LOTS 4 – 7 NOT-TOEXCEED PRICES (Jan 2008)

(a) The Lot 4 through 7 Not-to-Exceed (NTE) prices established at H-127, NTE Prices
(Jan 2008), shall be adjusted to account for abnormal fluctuations in costs, as measured
at the national level and reflected in the indexes identified in paragraph (c) below. Such
adjustments, if any, shall be based upon the formula specified in paragraph (f) below.
The NTE prices are subject only to upward adjustments. Prior to definitization of each
lot, adjustments to the NTEs will, if necessary, be made in accordance with this clause.

(b) Of the NTE prices specified at H-127, economic adjustments determined under this
clause apply to the NTE amounts, less the GE propulsion system, for priced labor and
materials (as identified in tables 1, 2 & 3). EPA adjustments for GE propulsion system
and spares are covered in contract clause H-125, Economic Price Adjustment for Engine
(Jan 2008). Prior to the definitization dates, the Contractor shall submit a proposal,
compliant with the Truth in Negotiations Act, to support definitization of each effort;
such proposal(s) shall constitute the basis for negotiation of fair and reasonable Firm
Fixed Prices for each option at less than or equal to the specified NTE amounts. It is the
intent of the Parties that Firm Fixed Prices for Lots 4 through 7, upon definitization, shall
not be subject to further Economic Price Adjustment except for that specified in Clause
H-125. If it is necessary to include EPA provisions in Firm Fixed Prices for Lots 4
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through 7 upon definitization, the extent to which the FFP is adjustable shall not exceed
the NTE amount for each lot as determined through this clause at time of definitization.

Table 1 - Labor and related NTE Amounts for Installation for CY2013-CY2016
subject to EPA

CLIN(s)
CY13
CY14
CY15
CY16
4004 $ 134,300,000
5004
$ 188,900,000
6004
$ 189,200,000
7004
$ 200,800,000

Table 2 - Material and related NTE Amounts for Long Lead and
Material/Fabrication effort by CLIN for CY2011-CY2015 subject to EPA

Effort
Lot 4 Long-Lead
Lot 4 Material/Fabrication
Lot 5 Long Lead
Lot 5 Material/Fabrication
Lot 6 Long Lead
Lot 6 Material/Fabrication
Lot 7 Long Lead
Lot 7 Material/Fabrication

CY10
$ 106,200,000

CY11

CY12

CY13

CY14

$ 317,600,000
$ 163,600,000
$ 503,000,000
$ 171,900,000
$ 530,000,000
$ 172,400,000
$ 540,700,000
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Table 3 - Spares and Support Equipment (less GE Propulsion System and GE
Propulsion Spares)

Effort
Lot 4 Spares $
Lot 4 SE
$
Lot 5 Spares
Lot 5 SE
Lot 6 Spares
Lot 6 SE
Lot 7 Spares
Lot 7 SE

CY11
44,100,000
11,162,000

CY12

$
$

CY13

CY14

60,000,000
17,110,000
$
$

59,900,000
8,911,000
$
$

73,700,000
-

(c) Global Insight’s forecasted indices shall be used as the standard of measurement for
this clause.

(1) The index used for calculations of this clause for Table 1 above is Global Insight’s
index for ECIPWAIRNS, Wgs & Sal, Private, Aircraft Mfg (2005:4=100).

(2) The index used for calculations of this clause for Table 2 and 3 above is Global
Insight’s index for WPIPIND, PPI Industrial Commodities (1982=100).

(d) The following rules shall apply in making numeric calculations under this clause:

(1) Round decimals to 3 decimal places;
(2) Round dollar calculations to the nearest whole dollar;
(3) Round up numbers equal to or greater than 5;
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(4) Round down numbers less than or equal to 4;
(5) Round percentages to 4 decimal places (e.g. 3.47%).

(e) For purposes of calculating the adjustments required by this clause, the following
projected average index rates shall apply. The source of the projected indexes shown
below is Global Insight’s 3rd Quarter 2007 Forecast. Table 1 reflects the projected
indexes for ECIPWAIRNS, Wgs & Sal, Private, Aircraft Mfg (2005:4=100). Table 2
& 3 reflects the projected indexes for WPIPIND, PPI Industrial Commodities
(1982=100).

Table 1

Table 2 & 3

(2005:4=100)

(1982=100)

Index Rate

Index Rate

CY2011

118.3

178.2

CY2012

122.0

180.0

CY2013

125.9

182.2

CY2014

129.9

184.4

CY2015

134.1

186.9

CY2016

138.4

189.4

Projected Time Period

(f) The economic price adjustment shall be calculated as follows:
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(1) Determine the twelve month index average for a particular year by summing the
twelve Global Insight monthly values and dividing by twelve.

(2) Divide this twelve month index average by the forecasted index rate identified
in paragraph (e) above for that particular year;

(3) Subtract 1 from this result and multiply the resulting answer by 100;

(4) If the absolute value of the result is greater than 2.0%, calculate the adjustment
by multiplying the result by the appropriate dollar value set out in the applicable
Table 1 and Table 2; if the absolute value of the result is less than or equal to
2.0%, do not calculate an adjustment.

(g) Notional Computation worksheet:

Step
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)*
(5)
(6)
(7)

Formula
Projected Labor Index rate from paragraph (e) Table 1
Forcased Labor 12 month index average rate (example)
Divide Step (2) by Step (1) and round to 3 decimals
Subtract 1 from Step (3) and multiply by 100 to convert to %
Input NTE Price for Labor & Related from Table 1 (example value)
Multiply Step (5) by Step (4)
Adjustment with 2% trigger band

Example 1
CY 2011
Result
118.30

Example 2
CY 2011
Result
118.30

116.056
0.981
-1.90%

121.151
1.024
2.40%
$ 200,000
$
4,800
$
4,800

$
$

-

* If the absolute value of the result is less than or equal to 2.00%, no adjustment
will be calculated; therefore, do not proceed to step (5).

Example 1: There is no EPA adjustment since the trigger band was not exceeded.
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Example 2: The EPA adjustment is a $4,800 increase in the NTE Price.

(h) In the event the Global Insight Indices used are discontinued or if Global Insight
suspends publication of an index identified in paragraph (c) above or significantly alters
the method of calculating the index, the parties shall agree upon an appropriate
substitute for the discontinued or altered index for use under this clause. If the parties
cannot agree on a substitute or comparable index (or cannot agree as to whether the
alteration to the index is “significant”) within 90 calendar days after an index has been
discontinued or altered in method of calculation, the Contracting Officer may, acting
unilaterally and subject to Contractor appeal in accordance with paragraph (i) below,
either adopt the Global Insight index as altered or establish a new index.

(i) Any dispute arising under or related to the terms and/or procedures set forth in the
foregoing paragraphs shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions of this
contract’s Disputes clause.

(End of clause)
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Appendix B: Contractor FPRA Escalation Rates and GI Forecast Deviation Graphs
Contractor Escalation Rates
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Global Insight Forecast Deviation from FPRA Rates Graphs
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